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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with the optimal state organizational structure to achieve 
homeland security missions, particular in the state of Wisconsin. It will therefore first 
review the relevant literature in order to identify a core set of critical homeland security 
functions germane to states. Four organizational models, as represented by four case 
states, will be examined to determine which meet those critical functions, to what degree 
and with what demonstrable success. Wisconsin’s current organizational structure for 
homeland security is evaluated in a gap analysis in that state’s capabilities, and finally a 
set of policy and organizational recommendations are provided for Wisconsin—and 
indeed other states attempting to meet these core critical functions—to achieve an 
effective design for organizing and communicating state homeland security activities 
within a structure that provides a comprehensive response and a stable and unambiguous 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Following two of the most devastating disasters the nation has endured in recent 
times—the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina in August of 
2005—states, including Wisconsin, have undertaken a review of their capacity to handle 
large-scale disasters in their respective jurisdictions.  In terms of reorganization, 
Wisconsin’s response has consisted primarily of creating a Wisconsin Homeland Security 
Council and designating a Homeland Security Advisor and a State Administrative 
Agency. 
The Council includes state agencies with significant homeland security 
responsibilities—chaired by the state Adjutant General.  A major challenge with the 
Council is that its structure is superimposed on the existing, basic government structure.  
That is, each member of the Council, with the exception of Emergency Management, 
reports to a separate department head, including the State Administrative Agency, which 
is the funding mechanism.  Therefore, although the designated Homeland Security 
Advisor, the coordinator of preparedness efforts through its emergency management 
agency, chairs the Homeland Security Council, the position does not have authority to 
direct resources, coordinate funding initiatives, or oversee the information-sharing 
process.  In addition, this structure results in a tendency for communicating critical 
homeland security-related information that is uncertain and a distribution flow that is 
based primarily on relationships. This present challenges during planning activities and in 
the response to major incidents—challenges that are likely to prove inadequate during a 
catastrophic incident.   
The present research examines the literature that provides the rationale for the 
creation of a federal agency to lead the coordination of Homeland Security.  In addition, 
the literature provides critiques of that agency’s effectiveness, including lessons learned 
from past disasters and other state models. The literature suggests that an effective 
homeland-security planning and response capability has specific and critical functions.  
Those functions include the following: 
 xiv
• There should be a comprehensive strategy to heighten the jurisdiction’s 
ability to prevent and protect against all forms of attacks on the homeland, 
and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection fail.  
• The jurisdiction should create a new and independent Homeland Security 
agency with responsibility for planning, coordinating and intefge4ating 
various government activities involved in homeland security.   
• Designate a single person, accountable to the chief executive, to be 
responsible for coordinating and overseeing the various government 
activities related to homeland security.  
• Jurisdictions should consolidate certain homeland security activities to 
improve their effectiveness and coherence.  
• Jurisdictions should develop a funding mechanism that is tied to the 
individual with responsibility for coordinating the homeland security-
related overall mission.  
• Homeland Security agencies should ensure that the organizational 
structure adopted provides an organizational information flow pattern that 
gets information to decision-makers in a timely manner.  
These critical functions are as applicable to states as they are to the federal 
government based on the rationale that the National Strategy was intended to be a 
framework for the interaction of federal, state and local jurisdictions in implementing that 
strategy.  In addition, states perform many of the same functions as those of the federal 
government in the area of homeland security.  
A review of four states, Georgia, Florida, Illinois, and West Virginia, indicate that 
each state has adopted two or more of the critical functions identified above.  In 
evaluating those states, it is apparent that states can meet their homeland security 
responsibilities without adopting all of the critical functions identified.  In addition, there 
is an apparent nexus between the number of critical functions adopted and the perceived 
effectiveness of states in addressing their homeland security responsibilities.  In this 
instance, effectiveness refers to the states’ ability to coordinate the homeland security in a 
comprehensive manner consistent with these identified critical functions.  
An analysis of Wisconsin’s current structure revealed gaps between that structure 
and the identified critical functions taken from the literature.  Wisconsin, as can the other 
states reviewed, meet its homeland security responsibilities under the current structure; 
 xv
however, it would benefit from reorganizing Homeland Security functions to comport 
more closely with these identified functions.   
This research therefore recommends that Wisconsin adopt legislation to establish 
a Wisconsin Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety closely resembling that 
of West Virginia: a stand-alone department headed by a single secretary, appointed by the 
governor, and encompassing multiple disciplines.  The entities making up that 
department include the Adjutant General, Forest Fire Service, Animal and Food Safety, 
State Police, Fusion Center, Emergency Management, and the State Administrative 
Agency.  A second recommendation is that an authorized task force research specific 
implementation issues for this proposal, conduct an outreach effort with stakeholders, and 


























A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Effectively organizing government structures for homeland security activities is 
still a “work in progress.” Following the deadly terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 
and Hurricane Katrina in August and September of 2005, questions still abound with 
respect to the most effective organizational structure for federal and state governments in 
responding to natural and terrorist-related disasters.  The potential consequences of not 
having answered these questions, however, are much easier to identify.  The negative 
consequences of ineffective organizational structures include sporadic and unreliable 
information sharing, fragmented preparedness and response strategies; the inefficient use 
of scarce resources, and, potentially and most importantly, the needless loss of lives and 
property.   
The sharing of information and distributed intelligence, for example, is critical to 
situational awareness of terrorist activities; yet, the recently approved Fusion Center for 
Wisconsin is primarily law enforcement-centric. Discussion continues at the state level 
on the need to identify additional staffing resources to expand the analytical capabilities 
of the Center. While we might be moving in the direction of an all-hazard, multi-
disciplinary approach to fused information/intelligence, this has not yet occurred. The 
inability to develop a strategy that promotes the sharing of appropriate information across 
the entire spectrum of ”homeland security” disciplines creates a diminished capacity to 
execute the Homeland Security mission throughout the state.  One example to 
demonstrate this point involves a state agency and its interaction with the information 
sharing process.  The Wisconsin Department of Agriculture Trade and Consumer 
Protection (DATCP) has the responsibility for a sector of critical infrastructure 
(agriculture and food) vitally important to Wisconsin and the nation. Although DATCP 
has a need for intelligence related to its area of responsibility, it lacks representation in 
both the governance and the customer groups of the Fusion Center.  Therefore, the Fusion 
Center, which has responsibility for briefing the Homeland Security Advisor and Council 
on homeland security-related threats to Wisconsin across as wide a spectrum of 
disciplines as possible, has no formal mechanism for collecting on behalf of or providing 
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intelligence to decision-makers within DATCP, or the Council as a whole on DATCP-
related issues.  Similarly, firefighters who encounter information related to Homeland 
Security in their firefighting or inspection role do not have access to a system for 
reporting it to the Fusion Center or receiving useful intelligence on what they might 
encounter while performing their expected public safety duties.  These examples 
illustrates a challenge that, when addressed in the context of a comprehensive homeland 
security strategy, also provides the opportunity to build a Fusion Center process around 
the established information-sharing guidelines that is inclusive of all first responder and 
non-first responder disciplines alike. However, any inability to acquire new resources or 
authority to redirect existing resources toward the goal of a truly integrated and 
comprehensive fusion process results in gaps in current planning, prevention, response 
and recovery efforts because of the lack of a comprehensive information and intelligence 
sharing environment.  
A substantial amount of time has been devoted to discussing and attempting to 
mediate an apparent mission conflict between two state agencies, both with Homeland 
Security responsibilities and separate chains of command.  Disagreements among some 
state agencies are common and a reorganization of state government will not prevent 
similar occurrences in the future.  Validation of the concept of a single individual with 
overall coordinating authority, seemingly, occurs in the referral of agency mission 
conflicts to an authority senior to both of the conflicted agencies.  In those instances, 
direction from a recognized and competent authority appears to be the missing ingredient 
in resolving those types of issues.   
For Wisconsin, funding processes are also a critical, and often criticized, reality of 
the homeland security dynamic.  In addition to having an adequate accounting system to 
track the incoming and expended funds, it is important to have a transparent process for 
key stakeholders to have input into the process of identifying spending priorities.  It is 
also equally important for those same stakeholders to be aware of and have input in the 
reprioritization of funds when that becomes necessary.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
In each of the challenges identified above, the opportunity exists to successfully 
convert the specific challenge into a component of an integrated and comprehensive 
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structure for addressing homeland security-related issues at the state level.  One might be 
tempted to look to leadership as the culprit in the identified shortcomings, but this 
assertion is unsupported as there are no ostensible problems related to Homeland Security 
information sharing within any single agency’s normal chain of command.  The 
problems, as outlined above, occur when information must transcend agencies to reach a 
Homeland Security Advisor or other designated leader of all efforts, policies and 
strategies.  In other words, it appears that the system itself rather than individuals in the 
respective positions must be the focus for resolving the issues.  The key to solving these 
particular challenges is determining and implementing an informational flow pattern that 
provides the most effective mechanism for planning and coordinating homeland security 
activities.  
The research question this paper will attempt to answer is which organizational 
structure is optimal for the planning and execution of homeland security-related 
responsibilities and that results in clear and unambiguous communications patterns at the 
state level. This thesis will examine the most critical functions and activities that 
homeland security organizations need to achieve, the current state structure and 
information flow pattern in Wisconsin, and alternative models adopted by other states 
that provide for a coordinated flow of information.  In addition, this thesis will examine 
various policy options that provide a comprehensive framework for meeting those critical 
elements identified above.  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF PROJECT 
Immediately following the attacks of 9-11, there was a realization at the national 
level that government as a whole lacks the appropriate organizational structure to wage 
an effective war on terrorism.  President Bush, addressing a Joint Session of Congress on 
September 20, 2001, stated, “The major institutions of American national security were 
designed in a different era to meet different requirements.  All of them must be 
transformed.”1  As evidenced by the numerous reports on Katrina and the 109th 
Congressional review of the restructuring of the Department of Homeland Security, it 
seems apparent that the federal sector continues to seek the optimal structure at that level.  
                                                 
1 George W. Bush, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington D.C: The White House, 
2002), 29. 
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With the exception of governors designating an individual to serve in the position of 
Homeland Security Advisor and State Administrative Agent, it appears that states, 
collectively, have not taken a research-based approach to organizing for homeland 
security along similar patterns.   Given their coordinating responsibilities between the 
federal and local levels of government, it is important that state governments organize in 
a manner that clearly identifies a single point of contact for those different levels of 
government, as this paper will illustrate. This research project will serve as a resource and 
a model for other states that are evaluating the effectiveness of the flow of information 
among state agencies with homeland security responsibilities. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The literature review will identify the critical functions that need to be performed 
by state homeland security organizations.  The criteria derived from the literature will be 
examined in four case study states, tested against the structure in Wisconsin and finally, 
options and recommendations will be proposed to advance Wisconsin’s effectiveness in 
its homeland security efforts.  
The next chapter, Literature Review, will examine and discuss the documentary 
foundation for this project, including the salient sources and legislation pertaining to state 
and federal-level organization. Chapter III examines the organizational structure of 
Wisconsin’s government as currently structured for addressing homeland security-related 
issues.  This chapter focuses on the Executive Branch and departments headed by a single 
Secretary appointed by the Governor.  In addition, the chapter describes and depicts the 
WI Homeland Security Council and the context of how it fits with the statutorily 
designated agencies. Chapter IV compares Wisconsin’s current state with the desired 
state of an effective organizational structure based on the critical functions identified in 
the literature.  Gaps between the identified functions and the current structure in 
Wisconsin are examined for each of the critical functions. Chapter V contains policy 
options and recommendations.  The options presented includes the status quo, a network 
adaptive management model, a unified command model, and a model that reflects the 
critical functions related to homeland security identified in previous chapters. Chapter VI 
contains conclusions on the legitimacy of the identified critical functions and 
implications for implementing the recommendations 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature addressing terrorism and homeland security at the international, 
federal, and state levels of government indicates that issues related to coordination, 
organization, and “who is in charge” are continually evolving.  There is consensus in the 
literature that coordination between various governments and levels of government is 
important; however, with the exception of Glen Woodbury’s work, there is no specific 
recommendation of how to achieve that coordination.   Therefore, any effort to maximize 
state governments’ effectiveness in responding to homeland security issues warrants 
additional research.  
A parallel body of literature compares various foreign governments and their 
methods for addressing terrorist threats with those of American jurisdictions.  One study 
examines how five foreign countries – Canada, France, Germany, Israel, and the United 
Kingdom – organize to combat terrorism.   The similarities to this research lay in the fact 
that each of these countries places the majority of resources for combating terrorism 
under one ministry, yet realizing the necessity for coordinating internally; the ministries 
have interagency coordination bodies.   In four countries, most of the resources to combat 
terrorism, their law enforcement and intelligence services, are centralized under a lead 
agency.  All five countries have clearly designated who is to be in charge during a 
terrorist incident.  
A search for literature that addresses state governments organizing or 
reorganizing along a Homeland Security mission-centric plan produces limited results.   
The literature reviewed here falls into three general categories: 1) the environment and 
challenges associated with the development of the Department of Homeland Security; 2) 
issues, challenges and general options for states contemplating the reorganization of state 
executive branches; and 3) the private sector, which can be instructive for governments 





A. THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
The question of organizational alignment for homeland security responsibilities 
predates 9-11.  For example, a commission in 1998 examined the nation’s ability to 
respond effectively to an incident of national significance.2  It found that: 
The U.S. government is not well organized, for example, to ensure 
homeland security.  No adequate coordination mechanism exists among 
federal, state, and local government efforts, as well as those of dozens of 
agencies at the federal level…Strategic planning is absent in the U.S. 
government and its budget processes are so inflexible that few resources 
are available for preventive policies or for responding to crises, nor can 
resources be allocated efficiently to reflect changes in policy priorities.3 
At that time, the Commission recommended a statutorily-created national homeland 
security agency with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various 
U.S. government activities involved in homeland security.4   
Shortly after 9-11, the question asked by those reviewing our response to those 
attacks, including Congress, was whether government in general and the federal 
government in particular had adopted the optimal organizational structure to meet the 
requirements for homeland security.5  The president quickly decided that there was sub-
optimal organization and, less than a month later, on October 8, 2001, he established the 
Office of Homeland Security by executive order.6   
In outlining the coordinating responsibilities for the director of the Office of 
Homeland Security, the president identified the need to have a single point of 
accountability for preparing the nation against future terrorist attacks.  Congress 
concurred, but was also interested in ensuring that the position, responsible for 
administering a multi-billion dollar budget, was statutorily accountable to Congress 
                                                 
2 U.S. Commission on National Security/21 Century, Final Draft Report, Road Map for National 
Security: Imperative for Change (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Commission on National Security, 2001), 25. 
3 Ibid, 7-8. 
4. Charles R. Wise, “Special Report: Organizing for Homeland Security,” Public Administration 




versus operating under the authority of a Presidential Executive Order.7  The central 
theme of that discussion appears, in its most objective context, to be that the maturation 
of the department is a work in progress; the question of authority and control is yet 
unanswered – or to be more precise, is answered differently in different quarters.  
In the early days of the department, former Secretary Ridge, commenting on the 
blending of agencies into the department, stated that the recommended structure would 
provide him with “all the resources I need.”8  One recent congressional report, however, 
graded the department with a D- in critical infrastructure security and a B- in emergency 
interoperable communications—with “incompletes” in biosecurity and employee 
morale.9   The “incomplete” in the first instance indicates that the nation’s biodefense 
capabilities—bio-intelligence and bio-surveillance –are not fully developed: the federal 
government is not prepared for a biological emergency.10  However, it also means that it 
is not clear who is in charge in the event of a biological event like a bioterrorist attack or 
pandemic flu.11  In the area of employee morale, the incomplete bespeaks the low morale 
of employees—only 3% felt personnel decisions were based on merit; 4% felt that 
creativity and innovation were rewarded.12   Much of the literature on the organizational 
effectiveness of the federal homeland security apparatus is summarized in presidential-
directed review of the federal response to Hurricane Katrina.  The report concluded, “our 
current system for homeland security does not provide the necessary framework to 
manage the challenges posed by 21st Century catastrophic threats.”13   The report also 
makes clear that it is not enough to merely bring a number of agencies together under a 
                                                 
7 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Hearing before the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 11 April 2002. 
8 Michael J. Hillyard, “Organizing for Homeland Security,” Parameters (Spring 2002): 75. 
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02spring/hillyard.htm  (1 of 12), [Accessed December 12, 
2005]. 
9 Democratic Staff of the Committee on Homeland Security, State of Homeland Security 2006 Annual 
Report Card (Washington, D.C., GPO, 2006). 
10 Ibid., 40-41. 
11 Ibid., 41. 
12 Ibid., 69. 
13 George W. Bush, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, 
D.C., GPO, 2003), 52. 
8 
single authority; their policies, strategies, and plans must be integrated and synchronized 
in order to achieve the required level of effectiveness.   
A large segment of the literature on Homeland Security at the federal level 
provides continuous evaluations and assessments on the structural design and the 
operational effectiveness of the new department.  The most recent document that seeks to 
answer the question of who is in charge is Public Law 109-295 dated October 4, 2006 
and enacted by the 109th Congress.  This law provides that the Administrator of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) shall, among other duties, “lead the 
Nation’s efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate 
against the risk of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, 
including catastrophic incidents.”14 Although the Agency (FEMA) remains under the 
leadership of the Department Secretary, the law specifically provides that the Secretary 
“…may not substantially or significantly reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or 
functions of the Agency or the capability of the Agency to perform those missions, 
authorities, responsibilities….”15  In addition, this legislation requires the Administrator 
of FEMA to collaborate with state, local, and tribal governments, other federal agencies, 
the private sector and others to build an effective national system of emergency 
management, and provides necessary funding under the direction of the Administrator to 
accomplish the task. 
The literature, consisting primarily of government documents, after action reports, 
comparative studies of other countries, and congressional hearings provides significant 
insight into the issues leading up to the designation of an entity responsible for 
coordinating homeland security, how the early iterations were assessed, and 
documentation of significant change.  The literature on the national (federal) and 
international levels reflects many commonalities in principles related to homeland 
security and terrorism.  The foreign countries, though they have different types of 
government, different cultures, and perhaps different perspectives on the war on terrorism 
from each other and the United States, share a common goal of preventing, planning for, 
                                                 
14 Public Law 109-295, 109 Congress, “Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007” 
(Washington, D.C. 2006), 1396. 
15 Ibid., 1400. 
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and responding to acts of terrorism.  They have adopted similar principles for organizing 
their resources to meet those goals:  They have identified a core group of resources, based 
on intelligence-driven threat assessments, likely to be deployed to a terrorist incident and 
placed them under the authority of a single entity with directions to coordinate with other 
agencies when required.  They have established a mechanism that clearly identifies who 
is in charge of terrorist incidents, which results in an unambiguous communication 
pattern.  Recognizing the need for a comprehensive approach to homeland security, 
Australia’s federal government claims the lead responsibility for national terrorist 
situations, while states agree to refer necessary constitutional powers to support the 
prosecution of terrorists by the federal government.16  In contrast, the National Strategy, 
in alignment with the federalist traditions of this nation, provides for the president merely 
to call on each governor to establish a single Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF) for 
the state, to serve as his or her primary coordinating body with the federal government.17 
B. ON RESTRUCTURING STATE GOVERNMENT 
This second literature comes closest to identifying options for states considering 
reorganization of their executive branches generally or in response to homeland security 
concerns.  While none specifically addresses the mechanics or logistics of the 
reorganization of state governments, it does assert “Federal, state, and local organizations 
will need to engage in serious efforts to make sense of the new security environment and 
what it means for structuring their own organizations and restructuring their relationships 
with other organizations.”18 
This body of literature also provides insight into issues related to how federalism 
will factor into the ongoing discussion on the interacting roles of federal and state 
governments as they relate to homeland security. In Incremental Consolidation and 
Comprehensive Reorganization of American State Executive Branches, Michael Berkman 
and Christopher Reenock argue that either incremental or comprehensive restructuring 
                                                 
16 Nicholas Grono, “Strengthening the Global Intelligence Network: Australia’s Response to 
Terrorism,” Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 1 (2001): 31. 
17 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 3.  
18 Wise, Special Report, 142. 
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can enhance administrative efficiency.19  This is due, in part, to the fact that restructuring 
often involves reining in bureaucracies to achieve efficiencies.  The relevance of this 
research is that it suggests that states need not undergo major restructuring in order to 
realize increased administrative efficiencies: “…the more a state is able to restructure 
through consolidation the greater its potential savings…”20 
The reorganization of the federal government to include the Department of 
Homeland Security has resulted in a trickle-down effect on a number of states.21   That is, 
the reorganization of the Department of Homeland Security has resulted in the 
reorganization at the state level. There is hardly consistency, however, among the states 
in the way they are structured.  As an illustration of the autonomy that states enjoy, the 
most recent data collected by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) 
reflect that twenty-four states have designated a Homeland Security Director/Advisor as 
the primary contact for homeland security-related matters.  Serving in that capacity in 
nine states are Emergency Management Directors, in seven states the Adjutants General, 
and in six states a Public Safety Director/Secretary.22   These designations do not reflect 
the complete organizational structure for homeland security and neither is that 
information contained in NEMA’s database.  This illustrates that although there is 
discussion on the inadequacy of the organizational structure at multiple levels of 
government, particularly following Katrina, there is not a lot of movement toward 
significant reorganization.   
In examining the role of state and federal agencies, Donald Kettl’s “Contingent 
Coordination: Practical and Theoretical Puzzles for Homeland Security,” offers insight 
into the issues and challenges of coordination between federal and state government.  
Kettl asserts that: 
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At the core of the problem are two issues: America’s historical tradition of 
local self-government, which has limited (in political and practical terms) 
federal dictate of state and local policy; and the technical difficulty of 
setting and enforcing standards, for intergovernmental programs in general 
and emergency services in particular.23 
Although Mr. Kettl raises the issue of the role and structure of federalism and 
invites debate on national power and local discretion, he also points out “Homeland 
Security challenges governmental leaders to balance the political attributes of federalism 
with the imperative of forging state and local governments into a reliable system that, in 
fact, makes the homeland safer.”24  This statement should be the guiding principle by 
which government leaders at all jurisdictional levels organize their homeland security 
responsibilities.  Mr. Kettl identifies two frequently overlooked and critical issues 
affecting the coordination of homeland security between federal and state governments. 
For example, as previously stated, the National Strategy merely calls on each governor to 
establish a single Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF) for the state, to serve as his or 
her primary coordinating body with the federal government.25 In another example, Lynn 
E. Davis, in “Organizing for Homeland Security” observes that perhaps the most difficult 
organizational challenge for homeland security is finding ways to ensure cooperation 
among federal, state, and local officials.26  Mr. Glen Woodbury, in “Learning Homeland 
Security – How One Executive Education Program Engages State and Local Officials,” 
provides additional insight into the value of federal and state government coordination of 
responsibilities without any specific guidance on the “how-to.”27 Mr. Woodbury, 
referencing homeland security, notes that, “State and local officials have been asked to 
partner in this national endeavor, but without a clearly defined road map or any precedent 
processes in place…”28 Mr. Woodbury goes further to observe: 
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Finally, it does not appear that any particular organizational template leads 
to successful homeland security efforts. What appear to be the more 
important criteria for an effective state effort are the strength of personal 
relationships among the players; the establishment of openly agreed-upon 
goals, objectives, roles, and responsibilities; and the commitment and 
involvement of the state’s governor.29 
While the above examples point out the need for coordination between federal and state 
government in the common interest of homeland security, a State of Wisconsin task force 
made a similar recommendation to its government leaders in 2003 that the delivery of 
public services be “based on the best functional rather than political lines.”30  The task 
force, in an observation similar to a Lesson Learned in Katrina, stated: “…business as 
usual will not meet the goal of improving service efficiency and containing costs.”31 
In response to the question of what is the business of the states as it refers to 
homeland security, I look to Mr. Woodbury’s stated (and unstated) objectives for the 
Executive Education Program: 
• Assist the jurisdictions’ executive leadership to build on their existing 
successes in Homeland Security preparedness and strengthen capacity to 
prevent and defeat terrorism.  
• Identify and examine homeland security concepts, challenges, and 
opportunities at the policy, strategic, and organizational design level.  
• Help the jurisdiction, and thereby the nation, “move the ball downfield” in 
their homeland security efforts by identifying the priority issues they need 
to tackle next in their efforts to protect and serve their citizens.32   
The first two points contain language almost identical to the objectives of the National 
Strategy—preventing terrorism, organizing for homeland security.33 In addition, while 
“moving the ball downfield” is an excellent metaphor, one might observe first that teams, 
particularly football teams, have a disciplined and coordinated team strategy and 
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32 Glen Woodbury, “‘Learning’ Homeland Security – How One Executive Education Program 
Engages State and Local Officials,” Homeland Security Affairs II, no.3 (October 2006): 5.   
33 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2-11.  
13 
someone designated to call the plays. Second, they all use the same organizational 
structures and templates: each has a quarterback, wide receiver, etc.   
Mr. Bruce Baughman, in testimony before the House of Representatives 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, described the states’ responsibility, 
as, in part, to “prepare for the threat of terrorism…training emergency responders and 
state and local officials on the National Response Plan (NRP)…evacuation, and other 
emergency needs.”34 Again, these functions of states appear closely aligned with those 
identified in the National Strategy.   
The literature addressing state governments’ role in homeland security 
consistently and unanimously calls for strong partnership between the federal and state 
government.  It is undisputed that states would benefit from “a clearly defined road map” 
on how best to structure such a partnership.35  The literature seems to provide a basis for 
structuring that road map.  Using the respective homeland security-related missions of 
states, which, based on the literature, aligns very well with those at the federal level, 
provides the means to identify similar functions.  The football team metaphor suggests 
that states can adopt a template for organizing to meet their respective homeland security-
related missions which is not mutually exclusive.  Those identifiable functions include 
organizing for the purpose of preventing future terrorist attacks and addressing “other 
emergency needs,” identifying the resources to do so and providing adequate funding, 
and identifying who is in charge of the efforts.  These functions provide a comprehensive 
approach easily communicated to the participants whether it is responding to a terrorist 
threat or moving the ball down field. 
C. THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
The final body of literature reviewed for this research examines information flow 
and business processes of the private sector. Large multinational companies and state 
governments share many of the same management and organizational challenges. The 
private sector has often used information technology to drive much of the re-tooling and 
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re-engineering of business processes that result in increased productivity.36 Managerial 
challenges—whether managing the functional segments of a major corporation, i.e. 
sourcing, product development, inbound/outbound logistics, or after-market services—do 
not differ significantly from managing the multiple functional disciplines, i.e. fire, police, 
public health, food safety, or emergency management within the jurisdictional classes of 
government.  An essential element for effective management of a supply network, for 
example, includes managing the flow of information corresponding to operational 
segments of the network along with integrated activities that link the various segments.37   
A benefit of this process is the real-time capture of events at the consumer level that 
allows management to analyze trends and accurately predict future trends.38 For example, 
in a supply chain network of a large corporation, a critical function of management is to 
manage the flow of information corresponding to operational segments of the network 
along with integrated activities that link the various segments.39 This is comparable to 
fusion centers in which government, exercising its homeland security responsibilities, 
collect information in as near to real-time as possible, analyze the information, and use it 
to make predictions about likely attacks against the homeland.    
Areas where private sector technologies play critical roles in support of the 
homeland security mission include surveillance technologies, inspection and detection 
technologies, and communications.  For example, technology related to casino security 
that allows casino managers to track both customers and potential cheats is being adapted 
to meet homeland security-related objectives.40 Not only are the Las Vegas casinos 
sharing technology with the Department of Homeland Security, they also share similar 
missions: 
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Las Vegas Casino: Mission:  Prevent and deter acts of crime and terror in 
and around casino and hotels.  Respond to all threats and hazards.  Admit 
lawful bettors and visitors.  Promote legal gaming.41  
Department of Homeland Security: Mission:  Prevent and deter terrorist 
attacks on U.S. soil.  Respond to all threats and hazards.  Admit lawful 
immigrants and visitors.  Promote the safe and secure flow of commerce.42  
There are, obviously, additional parallels that exist between the business functions 
and organizational design of private sector corporations and state functions related to 
homeland security.  This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive, neither is it the 
intent here to examine in detail the specific business functions that support the homeland 
security mission—a suitable topic for a thesis in its own right.   Homeland security 
practitioners will readily acknowledge the numerous ways business supports the 
homeland security mission, beyond the fact that private sector partners own the majority 
of the nation’s critical infrastructure.  The relevance of this body of literature is two-fold.  
First, it illustrates the ability to identify critical functions in both the private sector and 
government and design an organizational structure that produces desirable outcomes.  
Second, the example of how technology supports casino security—and recently 
homeland security—evolved from needs identified within the casino industry long ago.43  
The industry identified the need for a mechanism to combine basic information on 
employees and guests, such as home addresses, purchases, the times they visit town and 
the movements they make, playing habits, criminal pasts, and their connection to other 
visitors.  All of the functions lead to the creation of a computer system that makes “non-
obvious relationship awareness” (NORA) by probing databases searching for obscure 
matches between relevant information.44 The process used to develop this software 
illustrates the concept of “form follows function”—another parallel with designing an 
organizational structure for managing homeland security-related functions.  
The literature provides a strong basis for the identification of critical functions 
related to homeland security at all levels of government. The literature specific to the 
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federal level of homeland security consists primarily of government documents, 
congressional hearings, after-action reports, comparative government studies, and public 
appropriations laws.  Beginning with the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st 
Century Final Draft Report for a Road Map for National Security, the Commissioners 
identified the reason for organizing—to address the growing concern of mass-casualty 
terrorism that would be directed against the U.S. homeland.45 Second, the Commission 
recommended a strategy for responding to such an attack that prioritizes deterrence, 
defense, and response.46  Finally, it recommended a new agency, the National Homeland 
Security Agency, to consolidate and refine the missions of the nearly two dozen disparate 
departments currently assigned roles in homeland security.47  This is a critical body of 
knowledge because it was compiled over a period exceeding two years by a group of 
individuals selected by the Secretary of Defense with “widely-recognized expertise in 
fields relevant to the Study Group’s national security objectives.”48  In addition, this body 
of literature is important because of its development in an environment when the authors 
had the luxury to think about and “search out how government should work, undeterred 
by the institutional inertia that today determines how it does work.”49  It has, as the title 
suggests, served as a road map for the way National Homeland Security was organized 
and the route along which it continues to progress.  
Another important body of literature is concerned with the lessons learned in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.  The Department of Homeland Security was born out of 
the need to reorganize government’s capacity to respond to catastrophic incidents 
following the attacks of 9/11.  Hurricane Katrina provided the environment to test those 
organizational design-related decisions.  While not requiring a reversal of those earlier 
decision, it did reflect the need for substantial change, particularly in re-examining how 
the federal government is organized to address the full range of potential catastrophic 
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events—both natural and man-made, and synchronizing the nation’s homeland security 
policies, strategies, and plans across federal, state, and local governments.50 
The literature on state government and its homeland security responsibilities 
consistently indicates a need to coordinate/partner with the federal sector.  A more 
detailed accounting of the functions of state homeland-security roles by Mr. Bruce 
Baughman, Emergency Management Director of Alabama, indicates that states have 
similar requirements in homeland security as their federal partners. Mr. Donald Kettl 
introduces the idea that part of the reason for the coordination challenges between the 
federal government and state government relates to America’s historical tradition of local 
self-government, which limits the federal government’s authority to dictate state and 
local policy.51 The soundness of that doctrine is not at issue here; however, it may be 
possible to persuade states to organize in a manner that contributes to a national 
framework for addressing terrorism that does not impinge upon their respective 
sovereignty. 
In conclusion, the literature provides a sound rationale for anticipating the 
vulnerabilities that we face as a nation and in our respective states.  It also provides 
critical functions that appear to be synonymous with the homeland security mission 
irrespective of international, national, or state boundaries.  The literature on the public 
sector illustrates a number of relevant points to this report.  First, it provides an example 
of the criticality of a functional system of providing timely information to those who need 
it and the positive impact doing so has on the organization.  Second, it reflects that 
organizing around critical functions is a routine practice in the business community.  
Finally, it provides an example that identifying specific functions and designing a 
specific response to achieve the desired outcome represents a practical methodology.  
Conversely, the Department of Homeland Security after the attacks of 9/11 required 
information that the Las Vegas casino industry could provide, yet had not developed a 
form to capture the necessary information—suggesting that when function follows form 
the results can be chaotic and ineffective.   
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The literature reveals a core of several important functions necessary for an 
effective national homeland security structure. The most comprehensive overview of not 
only the need for a national agency to oversee homeland security, but also of specific 
recommendations for what an effective strategy contains is the document created by a 
fourteen-member commission lead by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren B. 
Rudman.52 The Commission’s Executive Director, retired USAF General Charles G. 
Boyd, wrote the document preface and cautions readers that: 
Organizational reform is not a panacea. There are no perfect 
organizational designs, no flawless managerial fix. The reason is that 
organizations are made up of people and people invariably devise informal 
means of dealing with one another in accord with the accidents of 
personality and temperament. Even excellent organizational structure 
cannot make impetuous or mistaken leaders patient or wise, but poor 
organizational design can make good leaders less effective.53      
The general concludes: 
Sound organization is important. It can ensure that problems reach their 
proper level of decision quickly and efficiently and can balance the 
conflicting imperative inherent in any national security decision-system—
between senior involvement and expert input, between speed and the need 
to consider a variety of views, between tactical flexibility and strategic 
consistence. Most important, good organization helps assure 
accountability.54 
Portions of the literature that reference homeland security at the federal level 
instruct those entities that they are to coordinate/partner with state and local 
government.55 Other portions of the literature make the argument that states are 
performing many of the same homeland security functions performed by the federal 
government.56  In announcing the National Strategy, the President emphasized in his 
attached remarks that it was a national strategy—not a federal strategy. Consistent with  
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the above, the functions identified here are viewed as applicable to federal and state 
government, adjusting for jurisdictional responsibilities that are unique to the federal 
government.   
The critical functions taken from the literature include: 
a. There should be a comprehensive strategy to heighten the 
jurisdiction’s ability to prevent and protect against all forms of 
attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention 
and protection fail.57  
The Commission found that the United States is very poorly organized to design 
and implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the homeland.58 The scope of the 
strategy and the capability of the United States have been enhanced since the time of that 
observation with the first National Strategy for Homeland Security in 2002. 
b. The jurisdiction should create a new and independent National 
Homeland Security agency with responsibility for planning, 
coordinating and integrating various government activities involved 
in homeland security.59    
This suggests that it was unacceptable to attempt to perform the identified 
functions operating from the organizational structures in place prior to the attack of 9/11.  
The Commission clarified its position on the need for a new agency by declaring, “We 
are frankly skeptical that the U.S. government, as it exists today, can respond effectively 
to the scale of danger and damage that may come upon us during the next quarter 
century.”60 This represents another recommendation by the commission that was 
adopted—first as the Office of Homeland Security and currently as the Department of 
Homeland Security.   
c. Designate a single person, accountable to the President, to be 
responsible for coordinating and overseeing various U.S. government 
activities related to homeland security.61   
That individual at the national level, as of March 3, 2005, is Secretary Michael 
Chertoff.62   At every level of organization, elected officials…must be able to ascertain 
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quickly and surely who is in charge.63   But in a government that has expanded through 
serial incremental adjustment rather than according to an overall plan, finding those 
responsible to make things go right, or those responsible when things go wrong, can be a 
very formidable task.64 In addition to designating an individual as being in charge, 
accompanying authority commensurate with the responsibility is critical.65 During the 
development stages of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, initial discussions on 
empowering the leader of that agency ranged from that of a cabinet position to the 
authority, as a Director/Secretary, to command the resources of other cabinet members.  
Ultimately, Congress chose to give the first Secretary what many would describe as 
insufficient authority to carry out the mission of the agency.66  In Rethinking the 
Department of Homeland Security, the authors assert that “the current organization of 
DHS must be reformed because it hampers the Secretary of Homeland Security’s ability 
to lead our nation’s homeland security efforts.67 
d. Jurisdictions should consolidate certain homeland security activities 
to improve their effectiveness and coherence.68  
The assets and organizations that now exist for homeland security are scattered 
across more than two dozen departments and agencies, and all fifty states.  The Executive 
Branch, with the full participation of Congress, needs to realign, refine, and rationalize 
these assets into a coherent whole, or even the best strategy will lack an adequate vehicle 
for implementation.69  The Department of Homeland Security absorbed twenty two 
federal entities—180,000 into its structure on November 25, 2002.70 Some of the critical 
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functions that were included in the new department included, Border Patrol, Customs, 
and Secret Service. 
e. Jurisdictions should develop a funding mechanism that is tied to the 
individual with responsibility for coordinating the homeland security-
related overall mission.71  
This critical function is inferred from the referenced source.  Testimony during 
the Senate hearing on the Secretary of Homeland Security addressed the issue of 
establishing the department by law versus Executive Order, in part due to the several 
million dollars the position would be responsible for administering.72   
f. Homeland Security agencies should ensure that the organizational 
structure adopted provides an organizational information flow 
pattern that gets information to decision-makers in a timely manner.   
…the incorporation of information technologies that facilitate data capture 
and transformation and information flow to decision makers enables 
organizations to better allocate resources internally and with external 
partners and outsourcers to better fulfill the needs of customers.73  
Inadequate situational awareness during the response to Hurricane Katrina 
resulted in decision makers relying on incorrect and incomplete information.74 
In conclusion, there are specific critical functions that can be taken from the 
literature: 
a. There should be a comprehensive strategy to heighten the 
jurisdiction’s ability to prevent and protect against all forms of 
attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention 
and protection fail; 
b. The jurisdiction should create a new and independent National 
Homeland Security agency with responsibility for planning, 
coordinating and integrating various government activities involved 
in homeland security;  
c. Designate a single person, accountable to the president, to be 
responsible for coordinating and overseeing various U.S. government 
activities related to homeland security; 
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d. Jurisdictions should consolidate certain homeland security activities 
to improve their effectiveness and coherence; 
e. Jurisdictions should develop a funding mechanism that is tied to the 
individual with responsibility for coordinating the homeland security-
related overall mission; 
f. Homeland Security agencies should ensure that the organizational 
structure adopted provides an organizational information flow 
pattern that gets information to decision-makers in a timely manner. 
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III. FORM FOLLOWS FUNCTION 
The phrase “form follows function” is an architectural principle.75  In this context, 
it means the restructuring of an organization should begin with a reevaluation of its 
purpose.76 In other words, our organizational designs for HS should follow from rather 
than dictate what critical functions we need to achieve.  For example, the U.S. 
Commission on National Security/ 21st Century spent over two years researching what 
potential threats faced the nation, what was necessary to prevent, protect against, or 
respond to a terrorist attack before making recommendations on the organizational 
structure of federal government to accomplish those tasks.77 
This chapter will identify the critical functions or outcomes necessary to achieve 
an effective state homeland-security structure as discovered in the literature and reflected 
in the cases examined.  Consistent with the above principle, it is important that the 
function be determined first in order to determine the organizational structure to achieve 
these functions.  The states examined were selected by, first, contacting the National 
Governors’ Association to determine if any states were organized consistent with the 
basic critical functions from the literature—one state was offered for further analysis.  
Three other states were selected based on anecdotal reputations for having good 
homeland security programs. 
Much of the literature reflects an encouragement for states to organize in a 
manner that addresses homeland security.  Portions of the literature suggest that 
organizing in a manner that effectively interfaces with the Department of Homeland 
Security is an effective structure. But in the absence of a detailed recommended model, 
states have organized according to individualized preferences.  The following are 
examples of the homeland security functions a number of states have identified in their 
jurisdictions and the forms they have adopted to accommodate those functional 
responsibilities.                                                   
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Figure 1.   Georgia Homeland Security Organizational Chart 
 
A. GEORGIA 
The above chart represents the state of Georgia’s organizational structure for 
coordinating homeland security responsibilities.78  In comparing the above structure to 
the functions taken from the literature, it appears that Georgia has adopted some form of 
all of the functions. Georgia’s official website indicates that it has developed a strategic 
plan.79  This aligns with the critical function recommending that there should be a 
comprehensive strategy to heighten the jurisdiction’s ability to prevent and protect 
against all forms of attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if 
prevention and protection fail.  Georgia’s organizational chart indicates that the state 
has organized in accordance with the function, as it applies to the state function 
recommending that a jurisdiction:  Designate a single person, accountable to the 
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President, to be responsible for coordinating and overseeing various U.S. 
government activities related to homeland security.  Georgia’s funding mechanism—
the State Administrative Agency—resides within the Georgia Emergency Management 
Agency, which suggests that it is tied to the entity with responsibility for coordinating 
preparedness efforts.80  This is consistent with the critical function recommending that 
jurisdictions:  Develop a funding mechanism that is tied to the individual with 
responsibility for coordinating the homeland security-related overall mission. In 
summary, while the Georgia model has served the state well for incidents to date, the 
Nationwide Plan Review assessed whether states’ plans were sufficient to meet the 
requirements of a catastrophic incident. The assessment found that more emphasis on 
catastrophic planning is needed in the United States. 
 
Figure 2.   Florida Homeland Security Organization 
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B. FLORIDA 
The above chart reflects the organizational structure that the State of Florida has 
adopted to manage its response to gubernatorial-declared emergencies.  The state is 
aligned in accordance with the critical function recommending: there should be a 
comprehensive strategy to heighten the jurisdiction’s ability to prevent and protect 
against all forms of attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if 
prevention and protection fail.  Florida’s vision, as reflected in the posted Strategic 
Plan, identified prevention, preparedness, protection, response, and recovery as major 
focus areas of its strategic plan.  Florida’s Domestic Strategy was developed within a 
week of the attacks of 9/11 by bringing together several hundred subject matter experts 
who worked around the clock to develop the strategy.81  The centerpiece of the strategy 
appears to be the Regional Domestic Task Forces—co-chaired by a FDLE member and a 
local sheriff.   Florida has identified the function of: Designate a single person, 
accountable to the President, to be responsible for coordinating and overseeing 
various U.S. government activities related to homeland security as an important 
function of emergency management and homeland security.  As described by a Florida 
senior manager, the model that the state uses to demonstrate that function as it relates to 
emergency management-related functions is based on the role of the State Coordinating 
Officer (SCO) in a declared “State of Emergency.”82  That individual, in the case of 
Florida, is the Emergency Management (EM) Director.  In declaring the emergency, the 
governor appoints the director to carry out the authorities vested in the governor for the 
duration of the emergency.83  In the event the disaster involves an act of terrorism or a 
pandemic, an Incident Commander is also appointed and that individual(s) and the SCO 
form the State Command and operate in a Unified Command Structure. This is 
noteworthy, in that although this process occurs in conjunction with a Governor Declared 
Emergency only, it is representative of a strong implementation of the function related to 
designating a single person—accountable to the governor and responsible for 
coordinating activities related to that disaster. A parallel, and sometimes combined, 
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structure has responsibility for Domestic Security—Florida uses the term Domestic 
Security versus Homeland Security to refer to internal security of the state.84 The 
Domestic Security responsibility is coordinated by a Domestic Security Oversight 
Council, which is chaired by the Florida Law Enforcement (FDLE) Commissioner with 
the Director of Emergency Management serving as the Vice Chair.  In the event that the 
incident for which the governor declares a state emergency is terrorism-related, the 
governor—in addition to naming the EM Director as the SCO–also names the FDLE 
Commissioner as the Incident Commander.85 This not only identifies who is in charge of 
the incident, it places together during the response phase the two individuals who work 
together coordinating the preparedness and prevention.  The funding mechanism also 
appears tied to the individual with coordinating authority for preparedness and is related 
to the critical function recommending that:  Jurisdictions should develop a funding 
mechanism that is tied to the individual with responsibility for coordinating the 
homeland security-related overall mission.   The process is that task force members 
and other stakeholders come together to review the strategy, identify national priorities 
for alignment with state priorities and make recommendations to the Domestic Security 
Oversight Council.86 
C. ILLINOIS 
The model that the State of Illinois has adopted for its homeland security-related 
responsibilities is represented in the organizational chart below.  Illinois’ model is 
consistent with most of the critical homeland security-related functions identified from 
the literature.  Illinois’s strategy, unlike that of many states, was developed in 2000, prior 
to 9/11.87 The strategy reflects consistency with the critical function that recommends: 
there should be a comprehensive strategy to heighten the jurisdiction’s ability to 
prevent and protect against all forms of attacks on the homeland, and to respond to 
such attacks if prevention and protection fail. 
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The state credits its Illinois Terrorism Task Force, comprised of fifty four member 
agencies and associations, with what it terms a sound strategic plan in the task force 
Annual Report.88 Additionally, the task force has responsibility for reconciling the state 
strategic goals with the national priorities and making funding recommendations for state 
initiatives.  The process, as witnessed by this writer, is very impressive.  It is transparent 
and obviously tied to the state strategy.  The discussion by the participants is focused and 
probing, yet professional with built-in flexibility.  This means the Executive Committee 
demonstrated a willingness to listen and make adjustments in spending authority when it 
seemed indicated.  The decisions of the Executive Committee are subject to review and 
approval by the Chief of Staff/Homeland Security Advisor, which are consistent with the 
function of:  should develop a funding mechanism that is tied to the individual with 
responsibility for coordinating the homeland security-related overall mission.  The 
state model does not embrace the “new agency” function; however, the critical homeland 
security-related agencies, as reflected in the chart, are coordinated at such a high level as 
to be closely analogous to that of a department head.  As reflected in the organizational 
chart above, the structure consolidates a core group of disciplines under the direction of 
the Deputy Chief of Staff.  This alignment is consistent with the critical function of: 
jurisdictions should consolidate certain homeland security activities to improve 
their effectiveness and coherence.   The Deputy Chief of Staff, designated as the 
individual with overall coordinating responsibility for homeland security, seemingly 
functions as a single agency—Designate a single person, accountable to the President, 
to be responsible for coordinating and overseeing various U.S. government activities 
related to homeland security. That model supports the function of providing a stable 
information flow pattern—the critical function that recommends: Security agencies 
should ensure that the organizational structure adopted provides an organizational 
information flow pattern that gets information to decision-makers in a timely 
manner.  Information sharing in a broader sense occurs through the Statewide Terrorism 
Intelligence Center (STIC).89 Based on briefings provided by members of the IL 
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homeland security team, the STIC is known to Illinois businesses who provide valuable 
information on suspicious activity connected to their properties; however, based on the 
Illinois Web Page, the STIC is law enforcement-centric.90 In summary, Illinois appears to 
be consistent with all of the identified function except that of a “new agency,” as 
indicated above. 
 
Figure 3.   Illinois Homeland Security Organization 
 
D. WEST VIRGINIA 
The State of West Virginia has adopted an organizational design structure that is 
consistent with all of the functions identified for an effective response to homeland 
security as extracted from the literature.  The vision for the state is to include its people, 
institutions and government by focusing on three mission areas: military affairs, public 
safety, and homeland security.91 There should be a comprehensive strategy to 
heighten the jurisdiction’s ability to prevent and protect against all forms of attacks 
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on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection fail. 
West Virginia adheres to the critical function of developing a new agency that includes a 
multi-disciplined corps of assets—as reflected in the organizational chart.  The 
jurisdiction should create a new and independent National Homeland Security 
agency with responsibility for planning, coordinating and integrating various 
government activities involved in homeland security.  This is the only state of those 
examined here that has a single department for handling homeland security-related 
responsibilities.   Jurisdictions should consolidate certain homeland security 
activities to improve their effectiveness and coherence. Consolidating certain 
resources related to homeland security improves their effectiveness and coherence.92  In 
terms of designating a single individual to be in charge, the governor- appointed 
Secretary and Homeland Security Advisor clarified his responsibility during testimony 
before the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence – Intelligence Reform – 
FBI and Homeland Security on 25 January 2007.  He stated, “In short, through my 
designation as Homeland Security Advisor to the governor, and as Cabinet Secretary, it is 
my responsibility and my duty to coordinate the entire range of government services for 
the public safety and the protection of the response to disasters of all types for the citizens 
of West Virginia.”93 Designate a single person, accountable to the president, to be 
responsible for coordinating and overseeing various U.S. government activities 
related to homeland security.  In his testimony before the Senate Select Committee, the 
secretary validated another of the critical functions related to homeland security: 
developing a funding mechanism that is tied to the individual with coordinating 
responsibility. Jurisdictions should develop a funding mechanism that is tied to the 
individual with responsibility for coordinating the homeland security-related overall 
mission.   He described incidents, discovered upon his arrival and assessment of the 
department, that were improper.  He subsequently moved the State Administrative 
Agency (SAA) function—responsible for coordinating and disbursing federal grant 
funding—to the Office of the Secretary.94  Secretary Spears commented on fusion centers 
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during his testimony, noting that while his state is in the beginning stages of setting up a 
true fusion center, fusion centers are often top-heavy with law information personnel.  He 
indicated that useful information from within jail and prisons as well as suspicious 
behavior reported by banks, railroads, chemical plants, and utility plants may provide a 
basis for analysts to determine a pattern of activity needed to thwart criminal or terrorist 
activity.95 The organizational structure adopted by this state, reflecting clear lines of 
communication and authority is consistent with the critical function related to: 
Homeland Security agencies should ensure that the organizational structure 
adopted provides an organizational information flow pattern that gets information 
to decision-makers in a timely manner.   
 
Figure 4.   West Virginia Homeland Security Organization 
 
                                                 
95 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Statement by James W. Spears on Intelligence 
Reform Hearing (Open), 2007, http://www.wvs.state.wv.us/dmaps/ [Accessed March 15, 2007]. 
32 
In addition to West Virginia’s alignment with the critical functions identified in 
the literature, it has also identified additional critical components that support the 
agency’s mission.  It has, as illustrated above, added a legislative function—important in 
tracking legislation from the federal and other jurisdictions and developing in-state 
legislative functions for support of the strategy.  The West Virginia model has also added 
two coordinating groups: one comprised of interagency representatives who work with 
the State Administrative Agency to coordinate agency funding initiatives, and a high-
level advisory group comprised of individuals representing other government agencies.96 
This organizational structure typifies the concept that: 
We need strong vertical lines in our organizations.  Hierarchy provides the 
critical, unifying structure to the capacity of complex organizations.  But 
we need horizontal relationships to put that capacity to work.  We need to 
organize vertically and to work horizontally.97  
In summary, based on the described performance of the state agency and its 
alignment with those critical functions taken from the literature, the state appears to 
represent a model agency for addressing homeland security-related functions at the state 
level. 
States can be at least partially sufficient in managing their homeland security 
responsibilities without conformity with those critical functions.  There is also a nexus 
between adoption of the critical functions and the perceived capability of a homeland 
security agency to plan, coordinate, and respond to terrorist-related incidents effectively.  
“Effective” in this instance refers to an ability to carry out the state’s responsibility 
utilizing a design structure that achieves oversight comparable with that achievable 
through adherence to these functions: 
a. There should be a comprehensive strategy to heighten the 
jurisdiction’s ability to prevent and protect against all forms of 
attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention 
and protection fail.   Although every state has given thought to the 
subject of homeland security, the strategic emphasis is not the same:  One 
state focuses on the possibility of a terrorist attack while another focuses 
on a natural disaster.  Many of the actions taken in response to 9/11 were 
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contained in the recommendations of the U.S. Commission on National 
Security 21st Century completed on January 31, 2001, which suggest 
above all that our failure to imagine an attack could actually occur and that 
the failure to plan properly could be costly in terms of American lives.98 
b. The jurisdiction should create a new and independent National 
Homeland Security agency with responsibility for planning, 
coordinating and integrating various government activities involved 
in homeland security.  Pre-9/11 the U.S. Commission on National 
Security 21st Century recommended a new agency be responsible for 
coordinating the response to terrorists’ threats.99  Several federal agencies 
had homeland security-related missions; the prevailing thinking of the 
commission was rather than assign that responsibility to an existing 
agency, it was best to create a new agency.100  Anticipated benefits 
included improved effectiveness and coherence.101  
c. Jurisdictions should consolidate certain homeland security activities 
to improve their effectiveness and coherence.  At the federal level 
consideration was given to what agencies have responsibility related to 
terrorism while realizing that the new agency could not encompass all 
government entities with some potential responsibility during an incident.  
Similarly, at the state level many government agencies have some 
responsibility during a catastrophic incident; the states most closely 
aligned with the identified functions, however, consisted of a core group 
of responders that include police, fire service, emergency management, 
National Guard, and State Administrative Agencies.   
d. Designate a single person, accountable to the President, to be 
responsible for coordinating and overseeing various U.S. government 
activities related to homeland security.   The value of that function was 
recognized to some degree in all of the states reviewed here. Equally 
important as naming an individual to be in charge is ensuring the 
individual possesses sufficient authority to coordinate the necessary 
activities.  In the states examined, one state had strong delegated authority 
to coordinate response activities during an emergency (it was unclear what 
that state’s authority was to coordinate training and exercises prior to an 
incident).  In another state, the authority to act on behalf of the governor 
and assume the role of Incident Commander during an incident is clearly 
defined during an emergency; however, that authority is not as clearly 
delineated for training and exercises during non-emergencies.  In one 
state, the individual with responsibility for oversight of those functions 
related to homeland security is undisputed.  The department, statutorily 
designated as an agency within the function of the executive branch of 
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government, has an appointed Secretary; however, subordinate members 
know to whom they are responsible.102 
e. Jurisdictions should develop a funding mechanism that is tied to the 
individual with responsibility for coordinating the homeland security-
related overall mission. The need for a funding mechanism that is tied to 
the person with responsibility to coordinate preparedness activities is 
critical.  During the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
Congress, realizing the level of funding that would necessarily accompany 
that office, wanted to ensure that that individual would be available to 
Congress if necessary. 103  In the state where functions align, funding still 
became an issue; however, the individual in charge easily resolved the 
matter rather than a drawn out process of negotiation.    
f. Homeland Security agencies should ensure that the organizational 
structure adopted provides an organizational information flow 
pattern that gets information to decision-makers in a timely manner.  
Clear lines of communication are necessary for the smooth functioning of 
organizations at all times—government and public sector alike.  They are, 
however, critical during a catastrophic incident—a lesson learned from the 
response to Hurricane Katrina.  Task forces and other structures outside 
that of a single agency have the potential for miscommunication during a 
critical incident.   In the state organized according to these functions, not 
only is the individual in charge clearly delineated, but the whole structure 
results in a clear information flow pattern. 
None of the case states has adopted all of the critical functions listed above, but 
where they do adhere to the critical function model in whole or in part, effectiveness 
follows.  The next chapter examines the organizational structure of Wisconsin 
government for homeland security-related issues. Chapter IV compares Wisconsin’s 
current state with the desired state of an effective organizational structure based on the 
critical functions identified in the literature. The gaps, or variance between the identified 
functions and the current structure in Wisconsin, are examined for each of the critical 
functions.   
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IV. WISCONSIN STATE GOVERNMENT 
A. WISCONSIN GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 
The first portion of this chapter provides a bit of background information on 
Wisconsin and its statutory structure, with a focus on the executive branch, as well as the 
homeland security-related functions the state has identified and the structure it has chosen 
to carry out those functions.  With its admittance to the Union on May 29, 1848, 
Wisconsin became the thirtieth state.104 State government divides its power and authority 
among three branches: legislative, judicial, and executive.  The legislative branch 
includes the Wisconsin Legislature, which is composed of the senate and the assembly, 
and the service agencies and staff that assist the legislators.105   The judicial branch 
consists of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, circuit courts, and 
municipal courts, as well as the staff and advisory groups that assist the courts.106   The 
executive branch, headed by the governor, includes five other elected constitutional 
officers, as well as seventeen departments and twelve independent agencies created by 
statute.107   
B. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
In order for any policy change to become law, it must have legislative approval, 
but since the Wisconsin Constitution delegates ultimate responsibility for state 
administration to the governor, the focus of this review is the executive branch.108   Of 
the eighteen departments comprising the executive branch, the governor, with counsel 
and consent of the senate, appoints the secretary that leads that particular agency for 
fourteen of the eighteen departments.  Of the remaining four departments, two are headed 
by boards that select the secretary and the final two are appointed by constitutional  
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members of the executive branch—the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and the 
Attorney General.109  The chart depicted below shows the departments appointed by the 
governor and the two headed by a part-time board. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Wisconsin: 14 Agencies Headed by a Single Secretary 
 
C. DEPARTMENTS 
In Wisconsin, the term “department” designates a principal administrative agency 
within the executive branch.110  Departments are structured hierarchically with the 
secretary reporting directly to the governor.  The major subunit of a department is a 
division, headed by an administrator that reports to the secretary of that division. Smaller 
work units make up the divisions. Within this organizational structure, authority and 
information flow vertically.   An examination of the Homeland Security Council and its 
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interaction with other departments reveals that it sits atop a statutorily-defined and rigid 
infrastructure. That is, the members of the council are also members of one of the 
departments represented above, obligated to communicate through their respective chain 
of command and at the same time report non-emergency homeland security-related 
information to the Chair of the Council.   
 
Figure 6.   Governor’s Homeland Security Council 
 
D. HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL 
Wisconsin State Statute, chapter 15.01(4) defines “council” as “a part-time body 
appointed to function on a continuing basis for the study, and recommendation of 
solutions and policy alternatives, of the problems arising in a specified functional area of 
state government…”111  That definition is reflected in the governor’s Homeland Security 
Council Charter, dated 3 April 2003.  The role of the council as reflected in the Council 
Charter, is “to advise the Governor and coordinate the efforts of state and local officials 
with regard to prevention of, and response to, threats to the homeland security of 
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Wisconsin…”  The Homeland Security Council is the model Wisconsin has adopted for 
implementing the previously-identified and critical functions of designating an individual 
to coordinate activities related to homeland security responsibilities and establishing a 
multi-disciplined core response capability. 
E. HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS 
The council is comprised of nine members, including the chair.  The Adjutant 
General of the Wisconsin National Guard, equivalent to a department secretary, chairs the 
council and, similar to the majority of other department heads, he receives an 
appointment from the governor.   The Adjutant General, in addition to having oversight 
for the Air and Army National Guard, oversees the Division of Emergency Management, 
itself another member of the Council.   
The Administrator of the Division of Emergency Management is a direct report to 
the Adjutant General for day-to-day functions and, therefore, for Homeland Security 
Council-related issues.  This is the only member of the council within the chain-of-
command of the Homeland Security Council Chair.  The Administrator of Emergency 
Management, appointed by the governor with consent of the senate, under the general 
supervision of the Adjutant General, is responsible for coordinating emergency 
preparedness on a statewide basis.   
The Superintendent of Wisconsin State Patrol is a division within the Department 
of Transportation.  The position has numerous duties and responsibilities related to 
Homeland Security, including serving as a liaison with local law enforcement.  In terms 
of policy development, budgeting initiatives, and day-to-day activities, however, the 
position reports to the Secretary of the Department of Transportation.   
With one exception, each of the remaining members reports to a different 
department secretary with their individual chain of command and information flow.  The 
administrator for Public Health reports to the Secretary of Health and Family Services.   
The Capitol Chief of Police and the Administrator for the Office of Justice 
Assistance, both, report to the Secretary of the Department of Administration.  The 
Administrator for the Office of Justice Assistance, the State Administrative Agency, is 
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also the individual designated to implement a critical core function: administering the 
funding that ties the homeland security-related activities together.    
The Deputy Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer 
Protection, a councilmember, reports to the Secretary of that department.  The 
administrator of the Division of Enforcement and Science, a councilmember, within the 
Department of Natural Resources reports to the Secretary of that department.  Finally, the 
administrator for the Division of Criminal Investigation, the ninth member of the 
Council, has significant Homeland Security-related responsibilities.  This position is the 
Council’s liaison with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force as well as oversees the State 
Fusion Center, the information-sharing network for the state. This administrator reports 
to a different constitutional officer of the executive branch, the attorney general, who 
might also be a member of a different political party than that of the governor.  
In addition to the distinct information flow patterns described here and the 
standard communication protocols that state agencies are familiar with, there are cautions 
in the statutes and other documents that influences coordination efforts and information 
flow patterns.  For example, Article 1 of the Governor’s Homeland Security Council 
Charter of 3 April 2003 states, in part, “The Council recognizes the authority and 
responsibility of local, state, and federal agencies in regard to Homeland Security.”  
Wisconsin State Statute chapter 15.04(1)(a)(b) specifically provide heads of departments 
and independent agencies the powers and duties of planning, directing, coordinating and 
executing the functions vested in the particular department, including preparing the 
budget.  
Finally, although the Adjutant General—the Homeland Security Council Chair—
is equivalent to a department secretary and the Department of Military Affairs is 
designated as an administrative agency, state statute provides insight into the extent 
coordination is possible without consent of the individual department-head. Wisconsin 
Statutes, section 227.10, states, “An administrative agency cannot regulate the activities 
of another agency or promulgate rules to bind another agency without express statutory 
authority.”  This statute is what, seemingly, makes the current Wisconsin model 
particularly challenging.  The designated Coordinator of Preparedness, as a peer of other 
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department heads or as the designated coordinator of response during a disaster does not 
have a solid basis for directing the activities or resources of other departments.   
In conclusion, Wisconsin has identified the critical core functions related to 
homeland security as referenced in the literature and modeled in other states.  There are, 
however, gaps between the current organizational structure and the organization that 
would yield optimal effectiveness.  The next chapter compares Wisconsin’s current state 
with the desired state of an effective organizational structure based on the critical 
functions identified in the literature.  Gaps, or the variance between the identified 
functions and the current structure in Wisconsin, are examined for each of the critical 
functions.   
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V. COMPARISON OF DESIRED END STATE VS. CURRENT 
STATE 
This chapter will examine the Wisconsin structure for addressing homeland 
security and compare that structure with the desired end state as envisioned by the 
literature.  Perceived “gaps”—variances between the current state and the desired end 
state are identified.   
As part of its assessment of states under the National Plan Review, DHS used the 
phrases “sufficient,” “partially sufficient,” or “not sufficient” in describing individual 
states’ levels of preparedness in catastrophic planning.112  Among Direction and Control 
annexes, a commonly- cited deficiency is a failure to define the operational structure for 
incident command and multi-agency coordination and the absence of a clearly-defined 
command structure.113 Wisconsin was rated “partially sufficient” because its plans were 
inadequate for responding to a disaster of catastrophic proportions. For example, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin’s largest city, had an evacuation plan in place that had been 
exercised for a maximum of 2,000 people.  Milwaukee is a city with a population of 
approximately 650,000; therefore, a plan to evacuate 2,000 becomes “partially 
sufficient.” Similarly, Wisconsin’s organizational structure has demonstrated the capacity 
to plan and respond to critical incidents, but the purpose of the Nationwide Plan Review 
was to assess the status of catastrophic plans and the planning process at the state level.  
Catastrophic planning, as defined by the Nationwide Plan Review, should address: 
Any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in 
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely 
affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national 
morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in 
sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost 
immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, 
and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly 
interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an 
extent that national security could be threatened.114     
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A. THE GAPS 
Chapter III, based on the aggregate literature, described what an optimally-
organized state government provides in order to meet its homeland security mission.  
Illustrated here is the desired end state versus the current state.  The bold type indicates 
the critical function identified from the literature and the following text describes 
Wisconsin’s status in relation to that function.  
1. There should be a comprehensive strategy to heighten the 
jurisdiction’s ability to prevent and protect against all forms of 
attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention 
and protection fail. 
Wisconsin has a comprehensive strategic plan developed with input from several 
stakeholders in the homeland security community.  The strategic plan encompasses 
activities within the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI).  The strategy is updated on 
an annual basis to coincide with national priorities and state spending initiatives.   
2. The jurisdiction should create a new and independent national 
homeland security agency with responsibility for planning, 
coordinating and integrating various government activities involved 
in homeland security. 
Wisconsin does not have a single agency responsible for homeland security. The 
governor created the Wisconsin Homeland Security Council that is arguably Wisconsin’s 
equivalent to a homeland security agency.  The members are depicted in the chart below.  
The agencies that make up the Homeland Security Council are representative of the 
agencies that typically are included in a single agency organized for homeland security, 
as reflected in the organizational charts of West Virginia and Illinois.  
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Figure 7.   Governor’s Homeland Security Council 
 
3. Designate a single person, accountable to the president, to be 
responsible for coordinating and overseeing various U.S. government 
activities related to homeland security. 
The individual/entity delegated as responsible for coordinating Wisconsin’s 
activities related to homeland security is the Adjutant General.  The Adjutant General, the 
Commanding Officer of the WI National Guard, is also equivalent to a Department 
Secretary for the Department of Military Affairs, which encompasses the Division of WI 
Emergency Management.  Chapter II, in reviewing some of the lessons learned in 
Hurricane Katrina, illustrated the potential negative consequences of not knowing who is 
in charge during a catastrophic incident.  In addition, the chapter identified two possible 
models that eliminate this organizational deficiency: Illinois and West Virginia. Under 
the Illinois model, the homeland security function is coordinated above that of 
department heads for an individual agency.  A Deputy Chief of Staff to the Governor—
who also serves as Homeland Security Advisor to the Governor—coordinates the core 
responsibilities for homeland security.  Coordination at this level appears to provide 
advantages in terms of unambiguous communication patterns and a clear delineation of 
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who has coordination responsibility and authority to act. Based on personal observations 
of the Illinois homeland security functions, it appears that the Homeland Security 
Advisor has a high level of awareness across the broad spectrum of homeland security-
related activities and appears to be engaged in the discussions and decision-making 
process, yet provides agency-heads the autonomy to carry out their respective missions.   
The West Virginia model entails the creation of a Department of Military Affairs 
and Public Safety, headed by a single secretary, appointed by and reporting directly to the 
governor.  The department encompasses a multi-disciplined group of first responders.  
This model clearly illustrates who has responsibility for the activities of the homeland 
security responsibility.  In addition, under this model, the secretary is responsible not just 
during a response—he/she has responsibility for coordinating the state strategy, 
prevention initiatives, and training and preparedness efforts.   
Contrast those models to Wisconsin in which the Adjutant General has statutory 
authority over the National Guard and Emergency Management, but a provision in state 
law, similar to that which existed at the federal level during Hurricane Katrina, precludes 
the Adjutant General from regulating the activities or promulgating rules that bind 
another agency without express statutory authority.  The Homeland Security Advisor 
serves as the Chair of the Homeland Security Council; however, that position does not 
have oversight authority in terms of resource allocation, funding priorities, or directing 
the formulation of the Wisconsin Homeland Security State Strategy.   
4. Jurisdictions should consolidate certain homeland security activities 
to improve their effectiveness and coherence. 
As previously noted, state governors arguably have the same responsibility to 
protect the citizens of their respective states as the president has for protecting the 
citizens of the United States.  The optimal organizational structure to accomplish that 
mission continues to be debated, particularly at the federal level.    
In deciding the organizational structure of the new Department of Homeland 
Security post 9-11, the president was answering the question, ‘what is the rationale for 
such a tremendous reorganization’?  The answer provided by the president and accepted 
by Congress was, “The establishment of a new Department of Homeland Security would 
ensure greater accountability over critical homeland security missions and unity of 
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purpose among the agencies responsible for them.”115  Although the Department of 
Homeland Security does not encompass all federal agencies that have homeland security-
related responsibilities, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred over twenty-two 
federal entities and 180,000 employees into the newly-created department.116  Those 
entities provide a core planning and initial response capability to catastrophic disasters. 
They include the Office of the Secretary, Border and Transportation Security, Emergency 
Preparedness and Response, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, Science 
and Technology, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Coast Guard, U. S. 
Secret Service and Office of Management.117 The basic composition of the Department 
of Homeland Security has until very recently (as of March 2007) remained essentially 
unchanged.  
A 2004 task force charged with assessing DHS efforts to meet its congressional 
mandates of (1) preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, (2) reducing the 
vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and (3) minimizing the damage and 
assisting in the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States.118 
The task force submitted over forty recommendations that, “…taken together …make the 
case for a significant reorganization of the department to empower the Secretary of 
Homeland Security and make the department a more effective and efficient instrument 
for preventing and responding to terrorist threats.”119  However, none of the 
recommendations called for the dismantling of the organization or removing/adding any 
significant components.  The major recommendations include strengthening 
policymaking; empowering the secretary; rationalizing government spending; clarifying 
authorities; and improving departmental oversight.120 On empowerment, the taskforce 
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recommended, “Empowering the secretary by establishing a ‘flatter’ organizational 
structure through (1) consolidating and strengthening agencies with overlapping 
missions; (2) eliminating middle-management (directorate) layers over border and 
transportation security, preparedness and response, and information analysis and 
infrastructure protection; and (3) having the agencies report directly to the secretary via 
the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security.”121  Similarly, the remaining 
recommendations represent efforts to ensure an organization that is flexible and 
responsive to a constantly changing threat with an increased international dimension of 
security.122 Many of the shortcomings of the department and the basis for a number of 
recommendations and observations by the task force surfaced during the response to 
Hurricane Katrina, which intersected the Homeland Security review process.  The White 
House Report, in reviewing the Hurricane Katrina response, found that, “In terms of the 
Federal Response, our architecture of command and control mechanism as well as our 
existing structure of plans did not serve us well.  Command centers in the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and elsewhere in the Federal government had unclear and 
often overlapping roles and responsibilities that were exposed as flawed during this 
disaster.”123  
Although the discussion on the organizational structure of the Department of 
Homeland Security continues post-Katrina, many of the findings are consistent.  For 
example, the House Katrina Investigation Committee concluded, “In responding to 
Hurricane Katrina, elements of federal, state, and local government lacked command, 
lacked control, and certainly lacked unity.”124  The committee recommends a 
reorganization of the Department of Homeland Security on a network model versus the 
hierarchical model on which it is currently organized.125 One of the acknowledged 
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weaknesses of the network model is that diffusion of accountability and performance 
assessment means assessing the performance of individual agencies in addition to the 
joint action of multiple agencies.126  This characteristic appears particularly relevant 
given that much of the discussion following the Hurricane Katrina review has centered on 
the question of who was in charge. The model described below answers that question 
more definitively at the state level.  
The State of West Virginia, similar to the federal agency for homeland security, 
has identified a multi-disciplinary cadre of state entities the governor uses to prevent, 
plan for, and respond to a catastrophic disaster. The organizational components obviously 
differ from those at the federal level and likely will differ from state to state, but the 
platform contains critical components for a comprehensive planning and response 
capability.  Included in the list of entities within the department are, in the case of West 
Virginia, the Homeland Security State Administrative Agency (SAA), the Adjutant 
General’s Office, Emergency Management, the State Police, and the State Fire 
Commission.   
The management of West Virginia’s Department of Military Affairs and Public 
Safety is unambiguous and clearly defined, with the governor at the top of the 
organizational chart, followed by the Cabinet Secretary, and all other components 
flowing into the office of the secretary.  This structure, based on the hierarchical model, 
also has elements of the network model.  West Virginia has an Interagency Coordination 
Planning Group, which is comprised of representatives from the member agencies and 
the state administrative agency.  The Interagency Group reports to the Senior Advisory 
Committee, which reports directly to the secretary.  The Senior Advisory Committee to 
Homeland Security Advisor Mission [emphasis added], not to the Department Secretary, 
is intended to enhance the integration and facilitate coordination among key agencies and 
disciplines receiving homeland security assistance and responsible for implementing 
homeland security initiatives.127  The members include the Cabinet Secretary of the 
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Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety (the Governor’s Homeland Security 
Advisor), two representatives from the Department of Health and Human Resources (the 
State Health Officer and the Bio-Terrorism Hospital Coordinator), Executive Director, 
National and Community Service, and Director of the WV Division of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management.  Under this model, the recommendations and 
decision made in the Senior Advisory Committee with respect to the Department of 
Military Affairs are final without referral to another agency or group of agencies except, 
obviously, the governor when indicated.  
Recognizing the right of each state to organize according its specific preference, 
contrast the West Virginia model to the Wisconsin model. Wisconsin’s equivalent to 
West Virginia’s Senior Advisory Committee to Homeland Security Advisor Mission is 
the Wisconsin Homeland Security Council.  The Adjutant General of the Department of 
Military Affairs and the Homeland Security Advisor chair the council.  The council is 
comprised of the following entities: the Superintendent of the State Patrol; Administrator, 
Division of Emergency Management; Administrator & Public Health Officer; Director, 
Office of Justice Assistance – Stand-alone State Office; Administrator, Division of 
Criminal Investigation; Chief, Capitol Police; Administrator, Department of Natural 
Resources; and Deputy Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer 
Protection.     
The Homeland Security Advisor in Wisconsin has no mechanism to ensure 
follow-up or compliance with any recommendation of the Council unless it is a function 
of Emergency Management, which is under the direction of the Adjutant General. The 
significance here, as the Homeland Security Advisor—with coordinating responsibility 
for overall activities related to homeland security—the authority to direct overall policy is 
uncertain. 
Pre-disaster planning and a comprehensive response to major disasters became 
global priorities.  On December 26, 2004, a tsunami occurred in Sri Lanka.128  The lack 
of pre-disaster preparation led to a large number of human casualties and massive 
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destruction.129  Recommendations for future planning include being “…bold and 
innovative and must think afresh so that we can convert this massive disaster into an 
opportunity.”130  Sri Lanka does not subscribe to the network model, rather the 
recommendation is for…” strengthening of the national disaster management authority 
with appropriate powers and resources to plan, coordinate, and implement all aspects of 
disaster management....”131 
The difference between two philosophical perspectives, one advocating a platform 
capable of launching a coordinated and comprehensive planning and response capability 
under the leadership of a single authority versus a diffuse model where accountability is 
difficult to establish and performance is difficult to measure represent the gap between 
what is desired and what exists in Wisconsin.   
One might pose the question, if the current structure is sub-optimal, what purpose 
does it serve?  Certainly, the state has demonstrated its capacity to handle a tornado, a 
flood, a snowstorm, or even a building explosion.  However, with the introduction of 
terrorism into the planning, what the National Response Plan is designed to address and 
what the National Plan Review was designed to assess is a jurisdiction’s capacity to 
handle catastrophic disasters. For a reasonable impetus for change in Wisconsin, it is 
useful to turn again to a parallel between Wisconsin and the Department of Defense.  “As 
part of its transformational efforts, the Department of Defense (DoD) must adapt not only 
to the post-Cold War, post-911 security environment but also must cope with many 
‘hidden failures’ that, while not preventing operational success, stifle necessary 
innovation and continue to squander critical resources in terms of time and money.  Many 
organizational structures and processes initially constructed to contain a Cold War 
superpower in the Industrial Age are inappropriate for 21st century missions in an 
Information Age.”132 Is that assessment likely to generate furious debate or is it more 
likely to motivate a nodding of heads in assent?  In Wisconsin, are the “hidden failures” 
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associated with tracking homeland security funding or not having a fully representative 
fusion center preventing operational success?  No, but they do result in time lost 
repeatedly searching for the information or diminished situational awareness regarding 
intelligence that potentially affects non-law enforcement entities. 
5. Jurisdictions should develop a funding mechanism that is tied to the 
individual with responsibility for coordinating the homeland security-
related overall mission.  
The funding gap in Wisconsin, to the extent that it exists, lies primarily between 
the current homeland security grant funding mechanism and the Homeland Security 
Advisor’s ability and authority to influence the funding decisions relevant to homeland 
security-related initiatives.  In the absence of any definitive guidance on structuring a 
model for expending homeland security funds at the state level, it is necessary to look to 
the literature and existing federal and state models.   
The National Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes the link between 
decisions on homeland security activities and costs.  In achieving the optimal balance 
between benefits and costs, the strategy identifies two overarching goals: to devote the 
right amount of scarce resources to homeland security and to spend these resources on the 
right activities.133  This suggests that there ought to be a strong nexus between the 
decision-maker, the individual with responsibility for preparing the nation or state for the 
challenges to meet homeland security goals, and the necessary funding to do so.  Based 
on those criteria alone, an objective assessment in Wisconsin of the nexus between the 
Homeland Security Advisor, responsible for coordinating the state response to homeland 
security preparedness through the Division of Emergency Management, and the State 
Administrative Agency (SAA), responsible for receiving and disbursing federal funds, 
illustrates a significant departure from these goals.  Essentially, the Homeland Security 
Advisor makes requests and recommendations on funding initiatives subsequently 
decided by the SAA, elevated to a third party, or left unresolved.   
First, a look at the federal sector model—one of the primary considerations in the 
establishment of a new Department of Homeland Security—was to ensure greater 
accountability over critical homeland security missions and unity of purpose among the 
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agencies responsible for them.134  In the context of tying funding to the oversight of 
homeland security-related activities, three components of the Department of Homeland 
Security have particular relevance here.  The Office of the Secretary has responsibility for 
overseeing “activities with other federal, state, local, and private entities as part of a 
collaborative effort …and to create a comprehensive response and recovery system.”135  
In order to track expenditures, the department has a Management Directorate.  This 
component, among other responsibilities, has oversight for administering department 
budgets and appropriations, expenditure of funds, accounting and finance, procurement, 
human resources, information, and tracking of performance measurements.136 While the 
Management Directorate has responsibility for the internal budget, another department 
component is more analogous to the State Homeland Security Advisor and the State 
Administrative Agency.  That component is the Directorate for Preparedness.  The 
Secretary, who has responsibility for developing, with direction from the president and 
input from other appropriate stakeholders, and executing the National Strategy, also has 
oversight of that entity that funds the various homeland security initiatives carried out at 
the state and local levels.  The Directorate for Preparedness, the entity from which State 
Administrative Agencies receive homeland security funds, works with state, local, and 
private sector partners to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and target resources 
where risk is greatest.137  This Directorate represents an important tool that the Secretary 
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security possesses to carry out his coordination 
responsibilities at the national level—a tool that the Wisconsin Homeland Security 
Advisor does not possess.   
West Virginia has a Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety, which has 
a Cabinet Secretary appointed by the governor.  The secretary, in addition to having a 
multi-disciplinary corps of first responders under his command, also has oversight of the 
State Administrative Agency.  In comments during a telephone conversation with the 
author, Secretary Spears indicated that the individuals he has delegated as grant 
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managers, who ensure adherence to guidelines, grant monitors, who periodically check 
equipment and programs to ensure they are on course, and an auditor share space within 
voice-calling distance of his office.138  In this model, similar to the federal model, the 
individual with responsibility for coordinating the homeland security response to 
potential terrorist acts also has oversight for the funds allocated to finance those efforts.   
Florida is an example of an alternate model; here, the State Administrative 
Agency designee is the Emergency Management Director—a model previously 
implemented in Wisconsin.  The Illinois model designates the Emergency Management 
Director as the State Administrative Agency.  However, in Illinois a multi-disciplined and 
multi-jurisdictional task force makes recommendations on the funding priorities that the 
Deputy Chief of Staff approves in a very transparent process.   
An illustration of tying funding to the coordinating responsibility of a particular 
entity on a micro level is the Wisconsin Division of Emergency Management (WEM), for 
which the Adjutant General has oversight, which administers the Emergency 
Management Performance Grant. Essentially, WEM sets its strategic plans for the 
upcoming year to ensure alignment with any shortfalls in preparedness or areas identified 
as not sufficient in the National Plan Review and directives contained in the grant 
guidance.  The division meets with the counties to negotiate and finalize the ‘activities 
and performance targets,’ described as the Plan of Work the counties will be responsible 
for during the upcoming funding year.  Upon agreement, each county receives its 
respective budgets based on a formula for individual counties, which totals approximately 
two thirds of the total grant.  Regional Directors work closely with county emergency 
directors and monitors the progress for the plan of work—recommending adjustments as 
indicated.  In a corresponding final phase, counties file a status report six months into the 
work plan. Failures on the part of counties to meet the terms of the work contract, 
deemed not in good faith, are subject to withholding of funds.  This process strongly 
suggests a link between the budget—administering of homeland security grants—and the 
entity with responsibility for coordinating homeland security-related activities. It is also 
apparent that, based on the literature, the models reviewed, and, particularly, personal 
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observation of the Illinois Terrorism Task Force going through the process of 
determining funding priorities, there is a gap between the desired and the current funding 
structure in Wisconsin.  
6. Homeland security agencies should ensure that the organizational 
structure adopted provides an organizational information flow 
pattern that gets information to decision makers in a timely manner 
Information contributes to every aspect of homeland security and is a vital 
foundation for the homeland security effort.139  The literature and the case states share a 
commonality in terms of establishing information policies: identifying who needs to get 
what information. An optimal information flow pattern results from designating the 
individual or position with responsibility for coordinating that organization or function.  
In West Virginia, for example, the Department of Military Affairs and Public 
Safety has a hierarchal organizational structure with the position of Secretary of the 
Department at the top of organization.  All of the other divisions within the department 
enjoy distinct lines of communication and authority to and from the office of the 
secretary.  This type of structure facilitates a formalized process for the routine flow of 
information to the decision maker(s).  In addition, this structure allows the Secretary of 
the Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety, the decision-maker in our example, 
to go directly to any Division Head and ask for additional information or to adjust a 
particular aspect of the Department instantly.   This organizational structure, 
appropriately interfaced with the federal sector, allows flexibility to respond rapidly and 
effectively to in-state emergencies in a coordinated manner, and work efficiently with 
federal partners and others involved in catastrophic incidents.   
In order to illustrate the stark contrast between the West Virginia and Wisconsin 
systems, it is necessary to revisit Wisconsin and its process for sharing homeland 
security-related information: the mechanism is the Wisconsin Homeland Security 
Council Chair who also serves as the Governor’s Homeland Security Advisor.  The 
Council meets on a monthly basis unless the Chair calls a special meeting.  With the 
exception of the Administrator of Emergency Management, who reports directly to the 
Adjutant General for day-to-day oversight, each member of the Council formally reports 
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to a secretary within his or her respective chain of command.  The structure of the council 
depicted in a hierarchal organization chart with the Adjutant General at the top of the 
organization is, in fact hollow.   
A demonstration of the effectiveness of the structure involves a past controversy 
over funding out of homeland security grant funds positions integral to the state’s 
preparedness efforts, for which the Adjutant General has oversight.  In that instance the 
Director of the Office of Justice Assistance (OJA) and the Administrator of the Division 
of Emergency Management was unable to resolve the conflict and it passed to the 
Adjutant General, the Homeland Security Advisor, and the individual ostensibly with 
responsibility for coordinating the state’s preparedness and response capability.  Because 
of subsequent meetings with the named entities and a representative from the Office of 
the Governor, the situation was temporarily resolved in favor of the Adjutant General’s 
recommendation; however, on a long-term basis the situation is unresolved to date.  
During the monthly WI Homeland Security Council, there is a closed session and 
an open session.  The closed session is the mechanism for providing the Homeland 
Security Advisor with sensitive information regarding the activities of member agencies.   
Each member chooses whether and to what extent information from their respective 
agency is shared with the Chair and other members.  This does not imply that members 
deliberately withhold information, but organizational structure is potentially a factor in 
what information is shared or not shared.   Fleming and Kaiwi discuss the use of shared 
and unshared information and unshared information in group decision-making 
situations.140  They draw two basic conclusions and comments from the available 
literature: 
(1) People are not very effective in communicating unshared 
information—groups tend to focus their discussion on information that is 
already shared, with the result that little, if any, unshared information 
moves into the shared environment, and (2) when unshared information 
does move into the shared environment, participants tend to ignore or 
discount this information and not factor it into their decision process in an 
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effective manner. The net result is that many group decisions are based 
upon incomplete information, i.e., decisions do not take into account 
information that would be available to the group if they were optimally 
exchanging and integrating unshared information. Group decisions can 
easily be sub-optimal when critical information is held by individuals and 
is not effectively shared.141 
The members of the Wisconsin Homeland Security Council are not part of a 
formally-constituted organization.  Rather, they are representatives from a disparate 
group of state agencies with individual homeland security-related responsibilities and 
without the benefit of an umbrella organizational structure to facilitate the routine sharing 
of information.   
Another aspect of the information-sharing challenge in Wisconsin is associated 
with the Wisconsin Fusion Center, designated the Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence 
Center (WSIC).142  The Wisconsin Fusion Center is relatively new and, therefore, not 
fully functional.   
The principal function of a fusion center is to compile, blend, analyze, and 
disseminate criminal and other information (including but not limited to threat 
assessment, public safety, law enforcement, public health, social service, fire, and public 
works) to support efforts to anticipate, identify, prevent, and/or monitor criminal 
activity.143  The Wisconsin Fusion Center, notwithstanding the recommended inclusion 
of the above sectors and disciplines, consists primarily of law enforcement entities. A 
statement incorporated into the document disseminated to members of the WI Homeland 
Security Council identifies the participants. The document contains the statement: “The 
WSIC Intelligence Bulletin is a collaborative effort of the Wisconsin Department of 
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Justice, Division of Criminal Investigation; United States Department of Justice; Federal 
Bureau of Investigation; Milwaukee Police Department Wisconsin Joint terrorism Task 
Force; the Eastern and Western Districts of the United States Attorney’s Office, Anti-
Terrorism Advisory Council.”144  In addition to the somewhat limited inclusion of 
agency participation in the fusion process, fusion center guidelines recommend that all 
investigative or intelligence personnel, as well as nontraditional collectors of intelligence 
such as fire, emergency management, and health personnel receive awareness training.145  
The rationale for such training is to ensure those personnel are appropriately equipped to 
identify suspicious activities or threats and provide such information to fusion center 
staff.  This also allows fusion centers to collect information from a broad range of 
disciplines with homeland security-related responsibilities that can be processed and 
turned into actionable intelligence and disseminated to all stakeholders based on their 
individualized needs.   
Inquiries into why the center focuses almost exclusively on law enforcement-
related information generates a response that the goal is to get the law enforcement piece 
in place first and then reach out to the other agencies.  This might not be a prudent 
strategy when viewed in the context of the debates involving the creation of the 
Department of Defense.  In that case, history informs us that political opposition and 
service parochialism prevented fixing fundamental problems in joint operations for 
almost forty years.146  The lesson is clear: Fix it at the beginning or live with the mistakes 
for a long time.147 
All the agency-heads and top managers with homeland security-related 
responsibilities in Wisconsin know each other, engage in regular dialogue, and exhibit 
high levels of professional courtesy toward one another. But collegial relationships and 
                                                 
144 Fusion Center:  A collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, 
and/or information to the center with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, apprehend, and 
respond to criminal and terrorist activity. U.S. Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, Fusion 
Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New World: Guidelines for 
Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Level: Law 
Enforcement Intelligence Component, Version 1.0 (Washington, D.C., 2005), 67. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Carafano and Heyman, DHS 2.0 Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security, 8. 
147 Ibid. 
57 
command and control are not the same.  “It” is about relationships; however, it is not all 
about relationships.  For example, one would appropriately consider an individual not fit 
for command who did not possess the intellectual acuity to recognize the value of 
relationships in coordinating high-level and complex missions.  Similarly, one would not 
expect the Adjutant General to conduct the business of a state National Guard Bureau 
based solely on strong relationships.  Therefore, upon the designation of State Adjutant 
General the individual is bestowed the rank of Major General—typically, the only two-
star general in the state—signifying his undisputed command of that Guard Unit.   
Finally, in an illustration of the gap that exists in Wisconsin between what is 
desired and what is in place presently can be found in an assessment of Wisconsin’s 
catastrophic planning capacity.  In the Nationwide Plan Review Command and Control 
section, Wisconsin received a rating of “partially sufficient:” “The actual mechanism 
need to be formalized so there is no room for misinterpretation, or misdirection, during a 
catastrophic event.  Formalization will then complement the strengths already 
depicted.”148 
Having the necessary resources available is not sufficient; they must be 
effectively coordinated, as illustrated by the Department of Defense under competent 
authority, i.e. Secretary of Defense.  Having the resources under a single authority 
without the necessary authority to coordinate and deploy them, as in the case of the 
Department of Homeland Security and reflected in the Katrina response, is also not 
desirable.  State agencies executing their respective homeland security-related 
responsibilities independently and at their discretion, and needing only to inform the 
Homeland Security Advisor is, at best, only partially sufficient.   
The next chapter identifies potential policy options and recommendations.  The 
policy options include maintaining the status quo, a network adaptive management 
model, a unified command model, and a research-based hierarchal model that focuses on 
the critical functions where gaps exist.  
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VI. POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A recommendation for change, accompanied by a recommended solution, is 
typically the preferred packaging by decision-makers for new ideas.  This report began on 
the premise that states in general and Wisconsin in particular benefit from an 
organizational structure that facilitates the effective and efficient flow of information 
among homeland security practitioners.   
Much of the literature reviewed for this report references the tragedies of 9-11 and 
Hurricane Katrina.  Although those catastrophes might continue to represent lessons 
learned well into the future, a general observation is possible now. Organizational design, 
government processes, and disaster planning did not function adequately in either of 
those incidents to meet the demands of the situation; hence the ongoing discussion as to 
how government at all levels might better prepare to respond to catastrophic incidents.   
Relevant literature suggests that organizational design, whether at the federal or 
state level, represents the focal point for optimizing the capacity to communicate 
planning for, responding to, and recovering from catastrophic disasters.  
Recommendations for reorganizing state government, however, must recognize that 
states have the authority and the responsibility to organize in a manner that serves the 
best interest of their citizens.  In Wisconsin, that authority and responsibility reside 
primarily with the State Chief Executive—the Governor and the Legislature.  Given 
these, the following policy options are presented in ranked order with the least desirable 
offered first.   
A. STATUS QUO  
A Latin term meaning the present, current, existing state of affairs, or perhaps, 
more appropriately in this instance, status quo ante bellum, meaning “as it was before the 
war.”  The organizational structure of Wisconsin State Government remains substantively 
unchanged post 9-11; changes have consisted of the establishment of a single repository 
for incoming federal funds and of a Wisconsin Homeland Security Council.  Each of 
those changes, undoubtedly, was indicated and appropriate at the time of implementation.  
However, as we have often looked to the aftermath of 9-11 and Hurricane Katrina for 
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lessons learned in preparedness and response, we must also periodically look internally 
for lessons learned in administrative procedures and make the necessary adjustments.   
A lesson learnable from the State Administrative Agency designation is that it has 
the undesirable and unintended outcome of diverting focus from operational issues 
related to homeland security to extended interagency discussion on funding priorities. 
This is a con to the status quo.  Another disadvantage is that the status quo supports a 
Homeland Security Advisor who does not possess authority commensurate with the 
designation of being in charge of coordinating homeland security activities on a statewide 
basis.  The Homeland Security Council does not provide a sufficient platform to sustain a 
Chair who speaks definitively on issues, including funding, across a broad spectrum of 
homeland security disciplines.  A final disadvantage is that the status quo is unstable in 
terms of responding to a catastrophic incident.   
In the field of engineering, the concept of a fragility curve implies that a building, 
as an engineered structure, does not fail all at once, but is subject to strains and stresses 
that accumulate until it reaches a point where it loses structural viability and collapses.149 
Organizational systems, as socially-designed structures, are similarly subject to stresses 
and strains that accumulate until they reach a point of losing viability and collapsing, or 
of no longer being able to function effectively.150 The goal of maintaining operational 
performance under varying conditions, however, is the same for both types of systems.151 
Lessons learned from two of the nation’s most horrific incidents indicate that responding 
to a catastrophic disaster, combined with cumulative existing stress, is a sufficient 
stressor to nudge an organization into collapse.  Wisconsin has demonstrated, and 
continues to do so, the capacity to respond to disasters of moderate severity involving in-
state resources.   Planning to respond to moderately severe disasters, particularly, when 
the opportunity exists to negotiate desired outputs, is an argument for maintaining the 
status quo.  Another argument for the status quo, and one often commented on by outside 
visitors, is the manner in which agencies seemingly work together—keeping issues from 
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the scrutiny of outsiders and senior leadership, maintaining what one former senior state 
leader has described as a façade. Therefore, while the status quo in terms of homeland 
security appears adequate and functional, based on organizational structure and 
processes, it is also, based on reasoned and measured evaluation, a candidate for collapse 
in the face a catastrophic disaster.   
B. THE NETWORK ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT MODEL 
The network model starts with the presumption that public functional fields are 
populated by a variety of organizations, government agencies, nonprofits, and for-
profits.152  “Networks are structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations 
as parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the other in some 
larger hierarchical arrangement.”153 In introducing the Network Model, Charles Wise 
here articulates some of the failures of the structure in responding to Hurricane Katrina.  
Among these is a White House Report that found, “In terms of the Federal Response, our 
architecture of command and control mechanism as well as our existing structure of plans 
did not serve us well.  Command centers in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and elsewhere in the Federal government had unclear and often overlapping roles and 
responsibilities that were exposed as flawed during this disaster.”154 The House Katrina 
Investigation Committee concluded, “In responding to Hurricane Katrina, elements of 
federal, state, and local government lacked command, lacked control, and certainly 
lacked unity.”155 The author further reports that a major issue addressed in the creation of 
DHS was to specify who is in charge.156 Congress failed to answer that question in the 
creation of DHS by refusing to give the head of the department authority to realign or 
direct the activities of other cabinet departments.  Instead, Congress merely mandated 
that the DHS secretary call on other cabinet departments for their assistance in homeland 
security tasks.157  Therefore, during Hurricane Katrina’s response and recovery, many of 
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the federal agencies relied on networking and Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) 
developed between the various federal agencies.  One reported limitation of that 
arrangement was the time involved with the Department of Homeland Security Secretary 
or his designee attempting to task another federal agency with an assignment and 
approval needing to travel up the chain of command of the requested agency for approval 
and back to point of required action.  Nevertheless, most, if not all, of the reviews 
associated with the performance of government, at all levels, have debated the issue of 
who was in charge or who should have been in charge.   
Prior to making his argument for the Network Adaptive Model, Wise defines the 
Hierarchical Model and acknowledges a number of its advantages.  “Hierarchy uses 
authority (legitimate power) to create and coordinate a horizontal and vertical division of 
labor.  The advantages provided for this model include: 
(1) it provides a form for employing large numbers of people and 
preserves unambiguous accountability for the work that they do. (2) It has 
the formal authority to compel. (3) It can provide institutional support for 
the current bundle of routines, information systems, values, and other key 
elements that influence production—offering a crystallization of stable, 
cooperative effort, the operational status quo.158 
After introducing the Network Model, he identifies one of the weaknesses as follows:   
One of the weaknesses of the network model is that accountability is 
diffused, and assessing performance means that not only must the 
performance of individual agencies be measures but also the joint action 
of multiple agencies (Wise and Nader 2006). Thus in an area such as 
homeland security, when performance gaps are experienced, it is difficult 
for policy makers to isolate and pinpoint fault.159 
Does this failure to hold leaders accountable for their actions (or lack thereof) also extend 
down to subordinate members of the organization?  Will they not be held accountable 
either for their actions, or will we have a system that holds one segment of the 
preparedness apparatus responsible and not another?  Wise further complicates the model 
by defining the broad categories of emergency management, i.e. preparedness, response, 
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recovery, and mitigation, and suggesting that preparedness, recovery, mitigation be 
managed under the network model and response—during emergencies, under the 
hierarchical model.  It is a strong consensus in the preparedness community that we fight 
as we train, we respond as we exercise—which leaves little opportunity to negotiate 
actions whether in preparedness or response.   
The Network model does appear to have efficacy in establishing relationships 
between varying jurisdictions; however, the hierarchical model with commensurate 
authority not just to coordinate but to act, appears best suited for homeland security 
missions at individual jurisdictional levels.  
C. THE UNIFIED COMMAND MODEL 
The Unified Command Model might appear strikingly similar to the Network 
Model at first glance, but there is a distinct difference, particularly as implemented in the 
State of Florida.160  The Unified Command Model is similar to the Network Model in the 
sense that prior to an incident agencies work together under whatever structure organizes 
them.  However, during a disaster, multiple agencies in a single jurisdiction or multiple 
jurisdictions responding to a single incident decide who will comprise the unified 
command and, typically, who will function as the Incident Commander.   
As implemented in Florida, during a disaster the governor declares a State of 
Emergency and names a State Coordinating Officer (SCO), the Emergency Management 
Director, who has responsibility for carrying out the authorities vested in the governor for 
the duration of the emergency.161  In the event that the declaration is for a specific threat, 
i.e. terrorism, pandemic, animal disease outbreak or a combination of threats, the 
Secretary for the respective area(s) forms a unified command with the SCO.162  The 
disadvantage of this model is that prior to a declaration, similar to the Network Model,  
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there appears to be ambiguity as to who is in charge.  Conversely, unlike the network 
model, this model includes the recovery phase of the disaster; there is certainty as to who 
is in charge.  
D. HIERARCHICAL MODEL WITH COMMENSURATE AUTHORITY TO 
ACT 
The establishment of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was 
meant to ensure greater accountability over critical homeland security missions and unity 
of purpose among agencies responsible for them.163 The issue of who is in charge was a 
major issue of discussion during the creation of  DHS, with proponents arguing for fixing 
accountability with the secretary and giving him the power to act and not just 
coordinate.164 Opponents argued against empowering the secretary to that extent and 
Congress, unable or unwilling to write a law giving the head of a department of homeland 
security what some equated with presidential authority to direct the activities or realign 
the resources of other cabinet departments.165  The authority of the secretary was 
revisited in 2004 when a task force represented by academia, research centers, the private 
sector, and congressional staff was tasked with assessing the effectiveness of the newly 
created Department of Homeland Security.  The task force developed forty 
recommendations that, “…taken together…make the case for a significant reorganization 
of the department to empower the Secretary of Homeland Security and make the 
department a more effective and efficient instrument for preventing and responding to 
terrorists threats.”166 A consistent theme and a bright line in the literature, including 
after-action reports following Katrina, is recognition of the need, particularly at the 
federal level, to fix accountability for our nation’s preparedness and response to 
catastrophic disasters and empower that individual with authority to act.   
Even as the National Strategy for Homeland Security was building managerial, 
budgetary, and structural flexibility into the federal government homeland security-
structure, there was recognition that in order for this strategy to be successful similar 
measures were required at state and local levels of government.   The United States, 
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however, enjoys a federalist form of government that basically provides that each level of 
government have certain activities on which it makes the final decision.167 With that 
limitation, the National Strategy can merely “suggest” similar measures for the rest of the 
nation.168 Nevertheless, within the discretionary authority of individual states, organizing 
in a manner that affords maximum compatibility with the federal government and other 
states specifically in the area of homeland security provides the highest level of state 
preparedness and promotes a truly national framework for homeland security.  Therefore, 
it is in the context of increasing the capacity for preparedness in Wisconsin, supporting a 
national framework for Homeland Security, and providing a model and a rationale for 
other states that this author offers the following recommendations.   
Recommendation #1:  Create, by decree of the governor and concurrence by the 
legislature, a Wisconsin Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety. 
Rationale #1:  Critical Function:  The jurisdiction should create a new and 
independent National Homeland Security Agency with responsibility for planning, 
coordinating and integrating various government activities involved in homeland 
security 
A Wisconsin Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety provides a 
basic yet comprehensive platform from which to address in-state disasters and a 
predictable mechanism for interfacing with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
and other states for planning, exercising, and responding to catastrophic disasters.  In 
addition, a stand-alone department, versus a collection of state agencies coordinated from 
a higher level, promotes cohesion and unity of purpose.   
Rationale #2: Other Wisconsin state agencies that mirror or closely align with 
federal counterparts provide an historical perspective for comparing this 
recommendation.  Those agencies include the WI Department of Health & Family 
Services, WI Department of Transportation, WI Department of Justice, WI Department of  
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Public Instruction, and others.  Each of these agencies represents a duly authorized and 
staffed agency versus, as in the case of Homeland Security, a virtual or theoretical 
agency.   
Recommendation #2:  A secretary appointed by the governor and confirmed by 
the legislature with collection of member agencies to lead the newly-created Department. 
Rationale #1: Critical Function:  Designate a single person, accountable to 
the President, to be responsible for coordinating and overseeing various U.S. 
government activities related to homeland security. 
Recommendation #3: Combine the below listed agencies into the newly created 
department.  
Rationale #1:  Critical Function:  Jurisdictions should consolidate certain 
homeland security activities to improve their effectiveness and coherence. The 
organizational structure would be as illustrated here: 
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Figure 8.   Proposed Wisconsin Homeland Security Organizational Chart 
 
Homeland Security Advisor – The Secretary serves as the Principal Advisor to the 
Governor on homeland security-related issues.   
Emergency Management – This position is pivotal for coordinating preparedness 
for natural as well as manmade disasters.  The position, although under the administrative 
authority of the secretary, reports directly to the governor during disasters and on critical 
issues related to preparedness.  The newly-created Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), as it is a part of the Department of Homeland Security, represents an 
excellent model for the placement of the Division of Emergency Management within a 
Wisconsin Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety.  It falls within the 
department, but it has the autonomy to coordinate and fund all-hazard preparedness at the 
state level—along with the necessary and commensurate authority.  In addition, as FEMA 

























is the president’s mechanism for responding to Incidents of National Significance, the 
FEMA Administrator has a dotted line of coordination to the president on issues of 
prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation.  Emergency Management is 
the governor’s mechanism for responding to disasters at the state level.  Wisconsin 
Emergency Management should reflect that placement and empowerment within a 
Wisconsin Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety, serving as the principle 
advisor to the governor on preparedness and issues arising out of response to a disaster.    
State Police – The State Patrol should be renamed the State Police and given full 
law enforcement authority to investigate crimes in addition to enforcing traffic laws.   
The actual act of statutorily re-tasking State Patrol would not necessarily affect 
Wisconsin County Sheriffs.  There is currently statutory language that that permits 
Wisconsin law enforcement agencies to operate in the same geographical area without 
diminishing the authority of any agency.  The State Patrol, as currently authorized, 
represents a state asset that in an era of scarce resources is underutilized.  
Division of Criminal Investigation – This division is organized under an 
independently- elected member of the Executive Branch; nevertheless, the division 
represents a critical asset for homeland security in terms of investigative and information 
sharing capability. Therefore, The Fusion Center should be realigned and made a 
Homeland Security Asset.  Under that structure, the Division of Criminal Investigations 
could assign staff as well as the State Police and other law enforcement entities that have 
prevention responsibilities.  Other disciplines, including health, agriculture, emergency 
management, and the public sector, that have critical all-hazards preparedness, response 
and mitigation responsibilities would become active members of the Fusion Center.  
National Guard – The Guard is a valuable asset in responding to a terrorist act or a 
manmade disaster.  The practice of having the agency with responsibility for tasking the 
asset during a crisis report to that asset on a normal basis can be problematic.  A better 
model, at the federal level, can be found in the New FEMA.  Each FEMA office has a 
military member, typically a colonel, assigned to each office.  Personal observation and 
conversation with a representative of that position indicate that the role of the position is 
to coordinate the military potential response to a major disaster with FEMA—the federal 
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agency for coordinating that response and state representatives—the likely recipient of 
those planning and coordination efforts.  Models at the state level include Alabama and, 
post-Katrina, Louisiana.   
Recommendation #4:  Reassign the State Administrative Agency (SAA) to align 
more closely with the responsibility for coordinating preparedness and response to 
disasters.  
Rationale #1: Critical Function: Jurisdictions should develop a funding 
mechanism that is tied to the individual with responsibility for coordinating the homeland 
security-related overall mission.   The State Administrative Agency (SAA) is the 
repository for federal homeland security funds and the critical link between the individual 
responsible for coordinating preparedness and response and the funding necessary to 
accomplish the related activities.  Two models support this recommendation in the 
research.  First, West Virginia has a model in which the Secretary has oversight of the 
SAA in addition to Emergency Management.  In West Virginia, the SAA function is a 
direct report to the Secretary, but that function has coordination responsibility with an 
Interagency Coordination Planning Group that has a coordination responsibility with the 
Senior Advisory Committee, which reports directly to the Secretary.  This ties all of the 
critical functions together—funding, interagency input, and review by a senior advisor 
committee, analogous to Wisconsin’s Homeland Security Council, with final sign-off by 
the Secretary.  Illinois has adopted a model in which the Emergency Management 
Director is the designated SAA; however, an Illinois Terrorism Task Force is specifically 
tasked with aligning available funds with the state strategy, and makes recommendations 
on prioritization for allocating the funds.  The task force is comprised of state agencies, 
representatives from local agencies and the private sector.  The process generates very 
candid discussion, including periodic challenges on an individual issue, but is very 
transparent and in the end, there is very strong group consensus. In addition, OJA 
coordinates the Citizen Corps Council—the entity that promotes citizen involvement and 
preparedness which is critical to overall preparedness.  
Capitol Police – Capitol Police has jurisdiction within state facilities and would be 
a responder for terrorist attacks against state-owned property.  
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Recommendation #5:  Ensure that the newly created organization provides clear 
lines of communication.  
Rationale #1: Critical Function:  Homeland security agencies should ensure that 
the organizational structure adopted provides an organizational information flow pattern 
that gets information to decision-makers in a timely manner. A single department 
comprised of multiple disciplines, similar to currently existing state departments, 
establishes unambiguous lines of authority and communication familiar to individuals 
who would staff the new agency and does not set up conflict between the parent agency 
and an important but “pseudo” agency. 
Additional state agencies currently represented on the Wisconsin Homeland 
Security Council are Division of Public Health, Department of Agriculture, Trade and 
Consumer Protection, and Department of Natural Resources.  Although typically not 
considered first responders, these agencies within their respective areas are responsible 
for critical missions in the event of a disaster involving their discipline.  Therefore, my 
recommendation is to include them, or minimally, require a formal liaison with the office 
of the Secretary or his/her designee.  
Rationale #2: The agencies recommended for inclusion within the department do 
not represent all of the state agencies with potential homeland security-related 
responsibilities during a disaster, as it is not practical to do so.  However, as pointed out 
in the National Strategy, after an attack occurs, our greatest chance to minimize loss of 
life and property lies with our local first responders—police officers, firefighters, 
emergency medical providers, public works personnel, and emergency management 
officials.169 A request for state resources is most likely by one of these disciplines when 
their resources have been overwhelmed. This corps of responders who plan, train, and 
exercise together and with local responders represents the most effective response to the 
majority of disasters to occur within the state.   
Recommendation #6: Appoint a Task Force to develop a detailed plan on the 
creation of a Wisconsin Department of Homeland Security with a report due to the 
governor in ninety days.   
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Rationale #1: The details of such reorganization, similar to those of the creation 
of federal counterparts, represent a major undertaking.  Issues requiring additional 
discussion include recommendations on the makeup of the department, a fiscal analysis, 
consultation with the numerous stakeholders, and operational mandates for the 
department.  While ninety days might prove an insufficient period, the idea is not a novel 
one for Wisconsin and there is a  certain urgency to the decision and the implementation.   
The discussion of reorganizing state government to better align homeland security-related 
functions might be fortuitous in that discussions are currently ongoing in Congress 
related to homeland security at the state level.  One recommendation by a Senate 
Committee significantly increases funding for Emergency Management Program Grants 
(EMPG) and allows portions of that funding to upgrade Emergency Operations Centers 
(EOC) with a 75/25 federal/state match.  A comprehensive state strategy for organizing 
homeland security capabilities in a manner that promotes closer coordination with federal 
resources, undoubtedly, makes a strong argument for federal funding. 
These recommendations will require significant effort to achieve buy-in from the 
impacted stakeholders, but they represent a solution for ninety percent of the issues 
associated with developing and implementing a comprehensive homeland security-


























Relevant literature, including reported lessons learned from previous disasters, 
similar models in government, personal observations, and professional experience 
combine to form the basis that strongly support the recommendations contained here.  
Political opposition at various levels of government and service parochialism represent 
significant challenges.  It is not the intent of the previous recommendations to represent 
organizational restructuring as a panacea, but there are benefits to such reorganization.  
First, a Secretary/Homeland Security Advisor empowered to act will provide a truly 
coordinated approach to homeland security-related initiatives.  The proposed structure 
promotes meaningful information sharing and unity of purpose among the team members.  
Second, while some might argue that Wisconsin is not at risk for a terrorist attack, we 
must recognize that a significant attack anywhere in this country—and most believe that 
there will be another attack somewhere—will reverberate and require a response 
throughout the nation.  A well-trained, multi-disciplinary team of first responders not 
only enhances our ability to prevent a terrorist attack and minimizes loss in the event that 
we do not; it also prepares the state to meet its other public safety responsibilities more 
effectively.  Conventional wisdom suggests that in the future, homeland security will 
have evolved into the routine way we provide public safety.  Such an evolution will 
require a much higher degree of coordination within specific jurisdictions and those 
jurisdictions networked nationally.  This proposal represents significant movement in that 
direction.  Timing appears optimal for initiating change of this magnitude for two 
reasons.  First, as the Nation and states ponder when the next terrorist attack or the next 
natural disaster of catastrophic proportions will occur, there is general concern among 
homeland security and emergency management practitioners regarding jurisdictions’ 
level of preparedness that permits an effective response—these recommendations, in 
terms of command and control, facilitates preparedness.  Second, Congress, apparently, 
recognizing the importance of increasing funding for the emergency management 
function in catastrophic disasters, has increased funding in that area and has discussion 
under way to increase funding specifically related to upgrading state Emergency 
Operation Centers (EOC).  An initiative that reorganize state government to be more 
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effective during disasters and that integrates federal partners into that initiative seems a 
likely candidate for favorable funding.  Therefore, to the question of can Wisconsin 
agencies continue to operate with the status quo and meet their responsibility for 
homeland security, the answer is yes?  To the question of would any state, including 
Wisconsin, benefit from organizing their homeland security responsibilities in accordance 
with these recommendations, the answer is absolutely?   
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